Truth, Autonomy, and Speech: Feminist Theory and the First Amendment.

Vol. 14 No. 9 (September 2004), pp.732-734

TRUTH, AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT, by Susan H. Williams. New York: New York University Press, 2004. 320pp. Cloth. $50.00. ISBN: 0814793592.

Reviewed by Kif Augustine-Adams, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. E-mail: adamsk@lawgate.byu.edu

In her meticulously argued and clearly organized new book regarding the First Amendment, Susan Williams reimagines truth and autonomy as “vehicles for the hopes and dreams of an age that must live without much certainty” (p.1). Using feminist theory as her primary critical tool, Williams “unravels the cultural meanings of the First Amendment” while suggesting new lines of development for free speech doctrine. This review, as any short review must, focuses on the major contours of her arguments; the nuances and tight formulations of Williams’ arguments invite First Amendment scholars and feminists to the book as a whole.

In Part I, Williams explains in detail the Cartesian conception of truth and the Liberal conception of autonomy that have traditionally informed freedom of speech arguments in the United States. Specifically, in the Cartesian construct, truth is objective, universal, and accessible through rational means. In the Liberal (i.e., Lockean and Kantian) conception of autonomy, independent, internally motivated individuals exercise their will. Williams’ thorough analysis ranges from John Milton to John Stuart Mills to Thomas Jefferson to Supreme Court cases. In the argument’s most basic form, free speech is justified because it contributes vitally to the discovery of truth and the exercise of autonomy; free speech may even by understood as autonomy itself.

In Part II, Williams subjects the traditional constructions of truth and autonomy to a piercing feminist critique. Williams grounds the feminist critique in social constructionism which challenges the objectivity, universalism, and rationalism that Cartesian truth and Liberal autonomy promise. The critique of individualism is particularly direct, as the feminist model recognizes “the fundamental interconnectedness and dependency” of human life (p.3). Moreover, Williams argues that traditional notions of truth and autonomy are “biased towards the male experience” and “form part of the traditional justifications for the subjugation of women” (p.4). The feminist analysis “allows us to see that [traditional notions of autonomy and truth] are conceptually incoherent, practically impossible, and deeply implicated in gender hierarchy” (p.9).

Despite the deep feminist critique of traditional constructions of truth and autonomy, Williams maintains that both are essential to the feminist project generally and to understandings of free speech specifically. Williams sees truth and autonomy – properly configured – doing real and valuable work “in our struggle to understand the nature of human knowledge and to explore and [*733] justify our moral and political systems” (p.5).

In Part III, Williams takes on the considerable task of reconfiguring truth and autonomy in light of the feminist rejection of the Cartesian and Liberal constructs. She constructs a relational model of truth which “facilitate[s] the creation of a shared reality that can ground joint action and decision making by groups” (p.96). Relational truth requires engagement and trust; it is contextual and normative. It is non-Cartesian in its emphasis on the plurality of truth rather than its universalism; it is relational, and so subjective, rather than objective.

Williams models autonomy as a narrative process where we actively participate in creating ourselves and our communities. That active participation, like relational truth, sets a basis for self-respect, for character and integrity, and for personal responsibility to a community of shared norms. Most succinctly, Williams’ model of narrative autonomy focuses on storytelling – “autonomy is the ability to tell and retell one’s own story” – which to a significant degree discounts the Liberal model’s focus on agency and choice (p.6). It is not that agency and choice are unimportant in Williams’ model; rather, it is their particular expression in the narrative mode that matters most.

In Part IV, Williams presents relational truth and narrative autonomy as justifications for free speech itself. The previous parts were necessary, if lengthy, preparatory work; this part fulfills the promise of the book’s title and is the meat of Williams’ contribution to free speech theory. Williams warns that neither relational truth nor narrative autonomy will determine the outcome of contested cases but hopes, rightly so, that her reconstructed theories of truth and autonomy will inform the “issues and arguments, out of which a variety of doctrinal approaches might be constructed” (p.173).

A primary contribution of Williams’ reconfigured truth is its argument that speech is itself a “system of relationships” rather than individual actions (p.175). What is protected, then, is not a particular speech act or individual speaker, as traditional constructions of truth and autonomy might suggest, but the relationships speech creates and maintains. Williams recognizes that some relationships may be destructive rather than productive – at the micro-level, the particular examples she uses are spousal abuse and rape – and concludes that the measure of protection any speech should receive is “the relationships it generates” (p.190). At the macro-level, systems of speech – the mass media, political campaigns, public education, and the like – must also receive protection as they contribute both to the construction of shared reality and a deep critique of that reality.

Williams does not reference by name the ethic of care that feminist legal scholars such as Leslie Bender have developed, but her arguments fit within that framework. As it emphasizes respect, responsibility, and chosen vulnerability, her approach is content-specific rather than content-neutral. That specificity will generate certain resistance as it confronts the content-neutral standard of much current free speech doctrine. [*734]

Like relational truth, narrative autonomy also justifies free speech. Williams defends individual speech, as opposed to any other act involving choice, as particularly important to narrative autonomy because speech uses symbolic systems (words) to create meaning (p.200). Williams spends considerable time distinguishing between a symbolic act by which the speaker intends to create meaning and a simple act by which the individual merely intends to change the physical world. Distinguishing between the two requires attention to numerous factors, none of which is either necessary or sufficient to show that a particular act is symbolic or simple. The factors include: intent, the public nature of the act, the use of commonly understood symbols, and a connection to the actor’s deep commitments.

In my view, Williams is not entirely successful in distinguishing between symbolic and non-symbolic acts, and thus justifying why symbolic speech should receive free speech protection. Williams wants to distinguish between simple acts of vandalism and symbolic speech by focusing on intent: “Intent is what distinguishes destroying files at a nuclear weapons plant by pouring blood on them from destroying them secretly to hide evidence of embezzlement” (p.202). As meaning creating activities, however, I find it hard to distinguish the two. Both are direct actions on the physical world and both are symbolic – the embezzler destroys files to hide evidence of her guilt, but also to deny that guilt, to preserve a construction of reality in which she is honest. From my perspective, the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic speech breaks down, because I see all human action creating shared reality, creating ourselves, creating community. Nonetheless, Williams’ analysis is thoughtful and provocative.

In conclusion, Williams offers truth and autonomy as interpretive processes for constructing reality and the stories of our lives (p.237). Her account of free speech is both fundamentally feminist and optimistic. In her own words, “the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect our ability to use speech for the essential tasks of meaning making captured by our models of relational truth and narrative autonomy” (p.242).

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