Vol. 2 No. 12 (December, 1992) pp. 191-193
THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COUNCIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE by Alec Stone. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. 312pp. Cloth $45.
Reviewed by Doris Marie Provine, Syracuse University.
Judicial review does not exist in the French court system. Nor do
the French accept the idea of courts as a co-equal branch of
government. No wonder de Tocqueville was surprised to find that
Americans turn every political question into a legal question.
France valorizes the concept of the general will,
institutionalized as legislative supremacy. The French ARE
committed to constitu- tionalism, however, and this creates a
certain tension in their politics. The institutional innovation
that is the subject of Alec Stone's book, the French
Constitutional Council, is an effort to respond to the problem of
unchecked parliamentary power in a constitutional system lacking
a tradition of judicial review.
The Council was a product of the political upheaval associated
with the birth of the Fifth Republic in 1958. The function of the
Council, according to its founders, was to keep Parliament within
the bounds established by the new constitution. In the words of
Michel Debr: "The creation of the Constitutional Council
manifests the will to subordinate LA LOI, that is, the decision
of the parliament, to the superior rule (RfGL) laid down by the
Constitution" [p. 47]. The Council has the power to approve,
annul, or "amputate" legislation on constitutional
grounds.
The Council does its work after legislation has been passed, but
before it is implemented. So-called "organic" laws and
standing orders go to the Council automatically, but ordinary
legislation is reviewed only if certain procedures are followed.
Originally this meant referral by the president, the prime
minister, or the chief officers of either chamber. Parliament
changed the rules in 1974 to allow 60 members from either chamber
to send a proposed law to the Council for constitutional review.
This small change has profoundly altered the stakes of political
conflict in France. The Council immediately became attractive to
minority coalitions within Parliament, who discovered that they
could block or delay new initiatives by taking constitu- tional
challenges to the Council. The Council, which had received only
nine referrals in its first fifteen years, received 66 in the
1974-81 period. The rate of referral continued to increase
between 1981-87, to 136 in that six-year period. These challenges
were often successful, particularly after 1981, the year the
socialists became the governing majority. The Council meanwhile
retained a more conservative majority. Not surprisingly, it found
many constitutional defects in the legislation the socialists
sought to adopt. Over half of the 92 laws it reviewed in this
period were declared constitutionally defective. The Council
softened its activism by avoiding wholesale rejection of
socialist-backed laws, preferring "amputation" of
certain parts, accompanied by detailed directions for revision.
Frequent nay-saying helped make the Council a significant player
in legislative politics. Parliamentary majorities began writing
legislation to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality and the
deputies began to heed the Council's prescriptions for revision.
Even legislative debates began to take on a legalistic tone,
deputies engaging in what one deemed "judicial
pointillism" to bring bills into line with constitutional
standards emerging from previous Council decisions (p. 210).
Stone appears to view these developments with a mixture of
appreciation (for the extra care given in drafting) and regret
(at the "pacification" of political debate).
Critics of the Council have charged that it creates a "gouv-
ernement des juges." Stone sidesteps this criticism by
arguing that the Council should be conceptualized, not as a
court, but as a third legislative chamber. Its nine members tend
to be professional politicians; these are not people trained for
the judiciary. Even the power to appoint Council members smacks
of political compromise: the president of the republic and of the
two legislative chambers each select three.
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These members serve for one non-renewable nine-year term. Former
presidents of the republic are entitled to lifetime membership.
The Council also operates completely independent of the court
system. It has no administrative authority over the judicial
system and hears no appeals from the lower courts. The Council
responds to legislators and high executive officials rather than
to ordinary litigants. It operates rapidly (within one month) on
the paper record, hearing no arguments and elucidating principles
in technical terms. A recent proposal to alter the system to
allow cases brought by litigants seeking judicial review was
defeated. Still, the Council's power to apply constitutional
principle to annul legislation suggests certain parallels with
judicial review as practiced in the United States. The Council
has found it helpful, for example, to develop a constitutional
jurisprudence in order to carry out its work. In France this
involves determining what is and is not constitutional principle,
a problem the Council has solved by steadily widening its
constitutional purview. This process began in 1971 when the
Council issued a MARBURY V. MADISON- style opinion declaring a
law that had been sought by the executive to be unconstitutional.
The Council found that the law, which withheld official
recognition from certain organizations, to be in conflict with
the preamble of the 1958 constitution, which declares France's
attachment to the Rights of Man as set forth in the 1789
Declaration and the 1946 constitution. The Council sometimes
justifies such potentially-explosive decisions with citations to
its own prior cases, thus incorporating a principle of stare
decisis in its jurisprudence. The Council's institutional
practices thus help it grow in political power, a pattern evident
also in the evolution of the American Supreme Court [Brigham,
1987].
French political scientists, Stone asserts, have taken little
interest in the Council's growing authority as an arbiter of
constitutional values. Legal academics have been more engaged in
studying the Council, but hardly from a critical intellectual
perspective. One can almost feel Stone's annoyance with the
closed-mindedness of the French academic establishment on this
subject. He describes an initial period in which legal academics
reacted with hostility to the Council. Scholars regarded it as
insufficiently independent from executive authority, judging it
by standards one might applying to a constitutional court. This
hostility had melted by the mid-1970's as decisions accumulated.
The tiny constitutional-law community finally had a body of case
material that it could use for constitutional theorizing. As
Stone puts it "a true constitutional law was being
born" (p. 98).
Presently, the scholarly legal community is solidly behind the
Council, so much so that scholars refuse to discuss the politics
of constitutional decision-making. Stone describes these
academics as vehement formalists, ready to explain the work of
the Council in terms lay people can understand, but ever-vigilant
to protect it from critics (like Stone!) who claim it is a
political institution. So committed are they to the nonpolitical
view that they have rewritten history to disguise the Council's
expansionist re-reading of its jurisdiction. The founders, for
example, had never intended that the preamble to the 1958
constitution would have "valeur constitutionnel," but
one would never guess this from scholarly writing on the subject
of the Council's jurisdiction.
Amazingly enough, no French political scientist has waded into
this void in critical analysis. Nor does there appear to be any
interest in engaging students in constitutional debate concerning
the Council's politics and perspective. Textbooks, including
those designed to educate lawyers, often ignore the Council as a
constitutional law-maker. Even in the popular press the Council
enjoys an aura of neutrality, rationality and expertise that
would be the envy of U.S. judges. The tendency toward reticence
is strongest among those who follow the Council's jurisprudence
most closely.
Stone finds danger in the commitment to treating the work of the
Council as separate from politics. Its legitimacy, he argues,
comes from its
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CONNECTION with politicians, not from a principle of separation
more appropriate to a court of law: "Politics itself confers
upon the Council a legitimacy as a POLITICAL body which may be
far greater than that accorded JUDICIAL institutions
elsewhere" (220).
The rise of the constitutional Council thus provides a backdrop
for an equally engaging history of cultural difference in
academe. Stone shows that scholars too are bound by culturally-
specific frames of reference. To think otherwise is a conceit.
Stone also shows, by example, the value of institutional analysis
that sweeps broadly across the political landscape. This panorama
provides the grounds for appreciating the significance of a new
player in constitutional politics and for considering the
viability of a system of abstract constitutional review as
compared to other alternatives. These strengths clearly
overshadow certain stylistic weaknesses in the book: a tendency
toward repetition and over- reliance on italics to drive points
home.
REFERENCES
John Brigham. 1987. THE CULT OF THE COURT. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Copyright 1992