Vol. 10 No. 2 (February 2000) pp. 127-129.
NYPD BATTLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES by Eli B. Silverman. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press,
1999. 243 pp. Cloth $50.00. Paper $22.00.
Reviewed by Craig Hemmens, Department of Criminal Justice Administration, Boise State University.
The public makes repeated demands that politicians and the police "get tough" on crime. The media often
follows the adage "if it bleeds, it leads," in choosing the story of the day. Not surprisingly, the
police have responded to all of this by seeking new and better ways to fight crime. These include more proactive
police investigative practices and an increased reliance on technology. Nowhere is this shift in police focus
more pronounced than in New York City, where the police have combined "zero tolerance policing," computers,
and new management techniques to fight crime. In the last five years, New York City has experienced a dramatic
reduction in crime. Between 1993 and 1997 the number of felony complaints dropped 44 percent, while the murder
rate declined by more than 60 percent. Although the New York Police Department (NYPD) is receiving much of the
credit for this crime decline, many criminologists have downplayed the NYPD's role. Instead, they have argued that
prevailing social, economic, and demographic conditions are the primary reasons for the unprecedented drop in crime
rates. Others have criticized the tactics employed by the NYPD. Although the media and politicians have had much
to say about New York City's turnaround, academics have, until now, added little to the discussion.
Eli B. Silverman, a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, has, in NYPD BATTLES CRIME:
INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES, provided one of the first in-depth scholarly accounts of the transformation of the New York
City Police Department. His account is timely, highly readable, andessential reading for criminal justice scholars
and practitioners, politicians, and organization scholars. It is also only part of the story.
Silverman begins his study with a historical review of the evolution of police reform movements in New York City.
He shows that the achievements and failures of earlier external and internal initiatives formed the foundation
for today's re-engineered NYPD. Silverman presents a clear account of previous attempts by the NYPD to improve
its image and reduce corruption. He argues, convincingly, that by the 1990s, NYPD administrators were more concerned
with preventing police corruption and improving the department's image than with reducing crime.
Silverman provides an excellent analysis of previous police reform measures and the political forces that doomed
them to failure. One chapter focuses on pre-1984 reforms, which generally came about in response to corruption
scandals. One result of these reforms was to further centralize
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power in police headquarters in an attempt to remove power from street cops, who were seen as too susceptible to
temptation. Another chapter focuses
on reform efforts between 1984 and 1994. The NYPD during this period made modest attempts to introduce community
policing, but the efforts were largely unsuccessful because the NYPD was resistant to change and city leaders failed
to support the programs.
In 1994 William Bratton became police commissioner and immediately instituted a number of significant reforms.
First, he insisted on using technology to improve efforts to fight crime. He increased the transfer of information
and pushed lower levels to use the information to reduce crime. He also instituted a regular series of meetings
with commanders to discuss crime statistics and to encourage innovative responses. From these strategy sessions
came the "zero tolerance" approach to law enforcement, the use of civil remedies to fight crime, and
the reorganization of the NYPD to give greater authority to the precincts so that they could respond quicker to
crime problems in their area. Bratton made a number of personnel changes, and he promoted those who obtained crime
reductions while forcing out those who were resistant to change. Mayor Rudolph Guiliani supported these measures,
and the crime reductions were highly publicized and garnered tremendous public support.
Drawing on privileged access to police documents and meetings, Silverman examines how the dynamic interaction of
specific strategic, organizational, and managerial changes redefined the approach to policing and transformed the
department from a reactive to a proactive force. Prior police administrators, stung by a series of scandals, had
moved to centralize power in headquarters and to insulate police officers from criminal opportunities. This was
achieved by limiting the power of precinct commanders and by discouraging proactive policing. Bratton demanded
an immediate change. He insisted on holding his precinct commanders accountable for increases in crime in their
neighborhoods. Bratton achieved this shift by utilizing Compstat, a sophisticated computer program that compiles
crime statistics, as the crucial mechanism for linking the development of new policies with effective tactics to
control crime. The up-to-date and accurate information provided by Compstat was used as the basis for discussing
crime control strategies with precinct commanders. The information provided by Compstat was used to improve planning,
coordination, evaluation, and accountability.
Bratton and his commanders developed a number of innovative strategies to reduce crime, but the one that has received
the most attention is "zero tolerance policing," or, as the NYPD prefers, "reclaiming the open spaces
of New York." The zero tolerance approach to crime is based on the idea that a focus on the more visible
crimes such as loitering, peddling, graffiti, and other "quality of life" offenses can reduce public
fear of crime. This requires the police become less reactive and more proactive. It also brings them into much
more frequent negative contact with many citizens, not all of whom are in fact violating the law. Mayor Giuliani
and the media seized on zero tolerance policing as the primary cause of the crime decline in New York, but as this
book points out, much of the credit for the decline might be a result of the Compstat meetings and the reorganization
of the NYPD.
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Silverman chooses not to cover, or more accurately dismisses with a couple of pages, the impact of the NYPD's crime
fighting strategy not just on crime rates (with which it might not be related), but on the residents of New York.
Organizational change and use of technology to better fight crime is all to the good and few would challenge the
assertion that these changes are for the better. However, intimately tied into these innovations is the decision
of the NYPD to employ zero-tolerance policing. There is almost no discussion of the troubling aspects of the NYPD's
zero-tolerance policing tactics, such as allegations of harassment, racial discrimination, and excessive force.
The highly publicized Louima beating and the Diallo shooting are the most prominent examples of such behavior,
but there are many more
complaints. Such reports suggest that police-citizen encounters have taken on a more hostile posture. Indeed,
Bratton openly endorsed the adoption of an "us-versus-them" approach to policing that is at odds with
community policing tactics, which stress cooperation with the community and citizen input in police decision-making.
Additionally, Silverman acknowledges at several points that there are other possible explanations for the reduction
in the crime rate, and admits that other cities, such as San Diego, have had equally impressive declines in crime
without using the same tactics.
This in-depth account provides a "behind the scenes" view of the NYPD and its efforts to fight crime.
The most interesting and useful component of the book, however, is its story of organizational change, innovation,
and continuity. Silverman provides a fascinating description of how a huge, slow-moving bureaucracy was transformed
into a lively, quick-acting organization through the adoption of technological advances and the implementation
of modern management principles and strong leadership.
The book is written in a lively manner, and the non-police professional learns a great deal from it. All government
and police managers should read this book. However, their reading should not occur in a vacuum. This book demonstrates
clearly that the NYPD has improved how it functions as an organization. Left unanswered by this book is the question
of whether some of the key methods of fighting crime are, in the long run, best for the city and its citizenry.