FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY IN ANCIENT ATHENS

Vol. 16 No. 6 (June, 2006) pp.517-519

FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY IN ANCIENT ATHENS, by Arlene W.

Saxonhouse. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 246pp. Hardback. $70.00/£40.00. ISBN: 0521819857. eBook. $56.00. ISBN: 0511137915.

Reviewed by Samuel B. Hoff, Department of History, Political Science, and Philosophy, Delaware State University. Email: shoff [at] desu.edu.

Arlene Saxonhouse, a University of Michigan professor of Political Science and Women’s Studies, continues her research in ancient political thought and democracy in FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY IN ANCIENT ATHENS. Her goal is to explore the democratic framework of government as a device for permitting free speech. Saxonhouse utilizes a variety of original documents to contrast the modern adaptation of free speech with that practiced in the self rule period of ancient Athens.

The text is divided into four parts, bordered by a Prologue and Conclusion. Part I includes the first two chapters. In Chapter 1, the works of Niccolo Machiavelli, John Milton, and John Locke on free speech are examined. The progression of the free speech clause in the American Bill of Rights is probed. Saxonhouse finds that the free speech designation was not a major issue in the debate for the amendment containing it. Further, the “separation of the people and its government, so much a part of our language today and so ingrained in our understanding of the freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights, has no place in the political culture of ancient Athens. The regime was the self rule of a democracy; it was not the liberal playing field of the individual protected by constitutional fences ensuring assorted rights claims against a potentially oppressive government” (p. 24). Chapter 2 presents the concept of democratic amnesia, or the replacement of a past-looking approach with a future-inspired framework. In doing this, the Athenian democratic regime removed the restraints of reverence, hierarchy, and aidos, shame, and replaced it with parrhesia, free speech.

Part II contains only Chapter 3. The intent here is to relate how shame inhibited unbridled speech and to differentiate shame from the concept of guilt. Part III encompasses two chapters. In Chapter 4, the practice of free speech in democratic Athens is highlighted. It should be noted that there were several exceptions to parrhesia in the Assembly. For example, noncitizens, debtors, those committing certain criminal acts, and those whose views were contrary to the well being of the city, were prohibited from speaking in the public forum. Chapter 5 details the trial of Socrates, the Greek philosopher who was executed for stating beliefs to his followers which were deemed threatening to the welfare of Athens.

Part IV covers the last three chapters. In Chapter 6, Saxonhouse discusses the limits on free speech in Athens imposed upon women and foreigners. Chapter 7 utilizes the writings of Thucydides, whose recordings of speeches in three democratic assemblies are presented. In [*518] each case, whether it be the Athenians’ debates over punishing the rebellious island of Mytilene or deciding to attack Sicily, or the Syracusans’ deliberation over whether they should prepare for an attack by the Athenians, the civic ideal of parrhesia falls short “when applied in the settings of democratic decision making”

(p.178). Chapter 8 transfers free speech from the political to the philosophical setting by examining the dialogues of Socrates and Protagoras, as told through the works of Plato. The juxtaposition of aidos with a questioning of the past still leads to a type of speech with boundaries on who could speak, when, and on the topics that could be discussed.

The Conclusion offers four paradoxes, partly as a parallel to the four stories found in the Prologue. The first paradox, between ancients and moderns, identifies the balance between free speech and order as a perpetual challenge for societies. The second paradox, between democracy and free speech, states that we need to heed the experience of the ancients so as not to practice speech without some limits. The third paradox, of Socratic philosophy and the democratic regime, declares that the location where speech is practiced can condition its use and effectiveness. Finally, the fourth paradox, that of shame and amnesia, reminds us that we can never escape speech possessing elements of both openness and reverence, even though eliminating the latter is the objective of a democratic regime.

Although the depth of examination of how free speech was practiced in an ancient community is unique to Saxonhouse’s study, other recent books have traced the history of free speech and probed its place in a democratic setting. Robert Hargreaves (2003) adopts a long-term perspective for investigating the subject. Juhani Rudanko (2003) employs fallacy theory to analyze American congressional debates over the Bill of Rights and the Sedition Act. Karla Gower (2002) scrutinizes the twentieth century development of free speech in the United States and Canada. Alternately, Cass Sunstein (1995) dissects disputes over free speech within a contemporary democratic framework. All except the Rudanko book devote more pages to the issues than the Saxonhouse text.

Saxonhouse offers much of interest to free speech scholars, but the book is not without some shortcomings. The organization of chapters is uneven. Further, the analysis of free speech in the American setting is brief, as only three Supreme Court cases are identified. While a complete coverage of cases is not expected, a more comprehensive overview of judicial decisions on free speech would have would have helped to elucidate understanding of its parameters. Finally, including the rules for speech by members of the U.S. Congress in their official capacity may have provided a fuller context with which to compare to the Athenian Assembly. Nonetheless, these areas of concern do not adversely affect the quality of Saxonhouse’s study. The material is meticulously researched and well presented. [*519]

The most obvious lesson we learn is that, regardless of the period in which it is practiced, free speech in a democracy is neither absolute nor arbitrarily inhibited. Instead, it is based on the combination of previous experience, present circumstances, and the characteristics of the polity.

REFERENCES:

Gower, Karla K. 2002. LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY IN FREE EXPRESSION LAW: THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing.

Hargreaves, Robert. 2003. THE FIRST FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH. Herndon, VA: Sutton Publishing.

Rudanko, Juhani. 2003. THE FORGING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Sunstein, Cass R. 1995. DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH. New York: The Free Press.

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