Vol. 7 No. 7 (July 1997) pp. 400-401.

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES by Giovanni Sartori. New York: New York University Press, Second edition, 1997. 217 pages. $18.50 Cloth. ISBN 0-8147-8063-6.

Reviewed by John W. Books, Department of Political Science University of North Texas.
 

In this second edition of his comparative study of constitutionalism, Giovanni Sartori refines his earlier arguments in light of the many recent changes in contemporary democracies. This edition shares with the original an extraordinarily literate style, especially given the necessity to present some highly technical information and ideas. For this alone Sartori is to be commended. But there is much more.

The author divides his task into three components: analyzing electoral systems, evaluating presidentialism and parliamentarianism, and prescribing constitutional changes based on the analysis of the first two. In his treatment of electoral systems, Professor Sartori reviews the most common and important forms of elections, their intended effects, and some of their unintended ones as well. His goal is to determine which is "best" -- an admittedly problematic task. He concludes that most often the preferred system would be the double-ballot structure. (As used in France, for example.) This is so for Sartori even though he seems to have a personal preference for the results offered by the single-member plurality system which gives Great Britain its alternating governments with substantial parliamentary majorities. He points out that such systems are not present in abundance in the real world, and for good reason. He is aware that the major electoral system types (majoritarianism, proportionalism, and double-ballot systems) all have strengths and weaknesses. Majoritarian systems offer the potential for strong parties and stable governments (good things, to be sure), but are suspect in terms of representativeness. PR systems score high on representativeness but may undermine the effectiveness of parties and governments. Double ballot systems provide some considerable room for both parties and voters to maximize preferences. But culture, history, and social structure all affect electoral outcomes, making fitting an electoral system to a given nation a tricky prospect.

Sartori observes that some societies may be so fragile as to practically require a PR system to avoid collapse, while others will tolerate the distorting effects of majoritarianism quite well. He is certainly correct in this. His analysis does not tell us which ones are at risk however, it just hints at tendencies. Sartori is concerned about the ability of electoral systems to provide a nation with governments which can govern (a unifying theme of this book). In the end it appears that there are no guarantees, even with the double-ballot system. Perhaps this is an unsatisfying conclusion for some. I believe it simply to be so. Moreover, I recommend the "laws" provided by Sartori in this section. Within the context of the possible they are compelling. He is unhappy with overquantification and thus offers instead well-reasoned argument for his positions. Many who read the electoral systems literature will find this refreshing. For the student of electoral systems, this section is very nearly must reading since it not only reviews all the important system types, it also presents their effects clearly and dissects their operation. And it does this without descending to a technical level which would make the analysis inaccessible to many.

In his second section Sartori ventures into an area which is more problematic: the relative strengths and weaknesses of Presidentialism and Parliamentarianism. Here there is less clear ground to stand on when assessing virtues and vices. Sartori leads us through the American Presidential systems and its derivatives, pointing out that the system has not traveled well. He argues that there is a broad misconception that the presidential system is inherently a strong one. Much depends on the party system supporting it, to be sure, but Sartori is convinced that Presidentialism is not a good prescription for stable government. Nevertheless, he would not suggest that a swift change to Parliamentarianism would improve most Presidential systems. One must say that here Sartori is unwilling to climb out on a limb. His evaluation of Parliamentarianism is similarly qualified. He divides these in terms of the strength of the Premier, and prefers strong Premiers generally (although not popularly elected ones). Complicating this discussion is Sartori’s digressions into video politics and the effects of political corruption. His view that these two factors are crucially new and important factors increasing the difficulty of effective government is extremely arguable. Corruption has been around a very long time, and the effects of television on politics are not nearly so dramatic as Sartori alleges.

This analysis is best when it sticks to the essentials of the systems, and even there, this section lack the punch of the first, due to frequent qualifiers. But it may be that Sartori is only using this section to set up his discussion and conclusions. For my taste there is too little here about how different actors, parties and groups especially, affect the operation of these systems. And there are frequent oblique references to national culture differences and similar factors which clearly are important and ought to be discussed directly, and then added to the analysis.

Given the thrusts of the first two sections, we are not surprised to find Sartori offering a mixed presidential/parliamentary system for our consideration as a better system than either of the others. Nor do we blink when he wishes to base this on a double-ballot system. This "Goldilocks" solution will presumably alleviate the worst elements of each system, not combine them. Sartori suggests that systems be, at base, Parliamentary. So long as the Parliament copes with the demands of the polity it continues to govern, but Sartori would construct the Constitution so that the President may step in immediately when things get tough. This way the Parliament would "behave," knowing that it could be replaced. But the President wouldn’t wish to intervene prematurely because early and fixed elections could bring him down. An enticing argument, worth considering. Observers of the U.S. system might feel that such a pattern would lead to pathological positioning on the part of the Constitutional "Partners," instead of the desired effect, but Sartori’s arguments are plausible.

Students of electoral systems and constitutional arrangements would do well to read this book. Sartori writes elegantly, reviews both areas very well, and offers contentious proposals. We can learn from him.


Copyright 1997