Volume 1, No. 8 (October, 1991), pp. 118-121
HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH by Ingo Muller,
transl. by Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1991).
Reviewed by Donald P. Kommers, University of Notre Dame
Ingo Muller's book, originally published in 1987 as FURCHT- BARE
JURISTEN: DIE UNBEWALTIGTE VERGANGENHEIT UNSERER JUSTIZ
(literally, "Dreadful Jurists: The Remorseless Past of Our
Judiciary"), describes the moral collapse of the German
legal profession and its role in facilitating the construction
and maintenance of the Nazi regime. Gracefully translated by
Deborah Lucas Schneider, HITLER'S JUSTICE seeks, first, to show
how legal professionals betrayed their trust as lawyers,
prosecutors, and judges and, second, to assess the degree to
which Germany in the postwar period reformed its legal system,
purged the judiciary of former Nazis, and re-dedicated itself to
the rule of law. Detlev Vagt's short introduction to the English
edition helps to orient the non-German reader. It contains an
overview of Germany's court system, a sketch of the legal
profession's organization, a note on the controversies about the
role of lawyers and judges under National Socialism, and a
summary of the allied effort to reform the German legal system
after the war.
The main message of this book is that lawyers and judges trained
to serve the Rechtsstaat (a state based on the rule of law) had
instead subverted it by going along with Hitler and his criminal
regime. Like physicians, professors, and even clergymen --
members of professions dedicated to serving human needs --
lawyers and judges, far from opposing injustice, actually helped
to perpetuate it. The judiciary's record by any standard is a
tale of iniquity, its collusion with evil having already begun
during the Weimar period when judges antagonistic to
constitutional democracy openly sympathized with Nazi defendants
accused of committing acts of violence against their political
enemies. Thus, as the author argues, the German judiciary
compromised its integrity even before the Nazis took over.
There follows an account of the various ways in which lawyers,
prosecutors, and judges subverted the Rechtsstaat during the Nazi
years. We find them making a mockery of the Reichstag fire trial;
conducting political trials and bullying defendants in open
court; confining political prisoners to inhuman prison
conditions; driving Jews out of the bar and off the bench;
depriving them in turn of all other rights of citizenship, even
to the point of imposing the death sentence for petty offenses;
formulating policies that allowed physicians to experiment
genetically on disabled people and to kill persons regarded as
unworthy of life; organizing special courts for the prosecution
of "asocial elements" and "political and military
enemies of the state;" and "correcting" the final
decisions of the regular courts to the disadvantage of defendants
or litigants disfavored by the state.
These perversions of justice were real. They happened, and the
author hammers home the reality of what happened by parading
before the reader example after example of judicial lawlessness
and legalized
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terror. Much of this story, based heavily on court records and
other official reports, has been told before. Actually, this book
is intended to refute studies that defend or explain away the
record of the judiciary during the Third Reich, seeking to
demolish any interpretation of that record that would diminish
the extent of its contribution to the rise and acceptance of the
Nazi state. Hence, armed with information selected from the
sources just mentioned and citing chapter and verse of laws and
regulations that sanctioned Hitler's justice, the author proceeds
to indict the entire judicial establishment.
Muller powerfully substantiates his indictment, yet somehow the
indictment is not sustained by the evidence adduced. He gives the
reader snapshots of the judicial role under the Nazis, and while
such snapshots build a case for an unquestionably broad
condemnation they do not warrant the conclusion that the judicia-
ry or the legal profession was totally corrupt. We read, for
example, that only one "stout-hearted" judge -- Dr.
Lothar Kreyssig -- "refused to serve the [Nazi] regime from
the bench" (p. 196), an assertion that verges on being an
ipse dixit. Did not other judges resist the pressure to do evil,
even if only by the smallest acts of insubordination? By the
author's own account Nazi officials had to "correct" a
large number of judicial decisions, belying the impression of a
totally tainted judiciary. He also reminds us that
"Hitler...considered jurists 'complete fools' incapable of
recognizing what measures the state had to take" (p.174). If
Hitler really had had his way, he would, like Dick the Butcher in
Shakespeare's Henry VI, have killed all the lawyers.
HITLER'S JUSTICE presses the claim, as already suggested, that
the judiciary, and indeed the entire legal establishment,
succumbed to the temptation of evil. It presses the claim too
far, however, and ignores evidence that tends to undermine its
wholesale condemnation of the judiciary. In this regard, it is
interesting to compare Muller's book with Marck Linder's recent
study of the Supreme Labor Court (THE SUPREME LABOR COURT IN NAZI
GERMANY: A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS, Frankfurt am Main: Vittoria
Klostermann, 1987). A careful study of the published decisions of
the Reichsarbeitsgericht between 1933 and 1945, it is a nuanced
account of the court;s work, for it resists the tempta- tion to
charge the judiciary en masse with carrying out the will of the
Nazi regime. Linder is able to show, for example, that in the
labor contract cases the Court was able to retain a large measure
of its autonomy, resorting in some instances to rigid formalistic
reasoning as a way of ignoring the Volk-consciousness that was
supposed to inform its decisions. Even Jews who lost their jobs
or pension rights as a result of a company's "aryani-
zation" were successful in their suits before this tribunal.
In short, Linder's study supports Ernst Fraenkel's notion of a
dual state in which a system of Nazi justice, practiced mainly in
special courts and criminal tribunals, coexisted along side of
courts that interpreted law much as they had done before 1933.
Another problem is the book's unevenness and anecdotal character.
Anecdotes do capture the reality of Hitler's justice but these
tales of injustice do not tell the full story of bench and bar
between 1933
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and 1945. In addition, some topics are covered in a flash while
others are treated at length. The author devotes thirty pages to
the Nuremberg laws and only three each to chapters on Hitler's
euthanasia program and the deeds of lawyers in the civil service.
In a two page chapter (pp. 138-139) on "the arbitrary
decisions of everyday life" he is satisfied with citing
decisions of six different courts, including the Prussian
Administrative Court of Appeals and the Supreme Labor Court.
Perhaps we should overlook the omissions in Muller's account.
After all, the criminal actions of some courts and judges need to
be placed under a magnifying glass if only as a reminder that
educated elites are as susceptible as the unwashed masses to
becoming unwitting as well as willing participants in the
commission of evil. The last part of the book, however, in which
the author assesses the Federal Republic's record in
"overcoming the past," is less excusable. Here the book
recedes into injudicious criticism of the Federal Republic's
effort to reform the judiciary and the legal profession.
Muller speaks of the postwar "re-Nazification" of the
German judiciary which in his view has had "a profound
effect on the development of democracy in West Germany" (p.
203). The charge of "re-Nazification" rests on the
large number of former National Socialists who were apparently
reappointed to the judiciary after the war. Rightly, Muller
condemns the reappointment of the judges who were implicated in
Nazi crimes, but mere membership in the Nazi party neither could
nor should have been a disqualifying factor in judicial
appointments since judges and lawyers who joined the party did so
for a wide variety of reasons ranging from mere expediency to
ideological conviction. Karl Jaspers once distinguished between
the four kinds of guilt among the men and women who lived and
worked in Nazi Germany, namely, metaphys- ical, moral, political,
and criminal. Muller's account is inattentive to these
distinctions.
The author's description of the West German judiciary illustrates
his partisanship. The first is his criticism of the postwar
revival of natural law in Germany or certain "supra-
positive" standards of judicial review, a criticism that
recalls his attack, earlier in the book on teleological methods
of inquiry used by certain courts during the Weimar Republic.
Here the author tries to rescue legal positivism from the
familiar charge that it caused the breakdown of the rule of law
during the Nazi period. He is surely right to attack this
oversimplified view of legal positivism, but he is surely wrong
to suggest that teleological analysis or natural law thought in
its West German incarnation is a continuation of old ways of
legal thinking. Teleological inquiry is in fact a standard mode
of analysis in many constitutional courts today, including the
European Court of Justice.
Second, the author barely conceals his political leanings in
condemning the generally conservative work-product of the West
German judiciary, including decisions relating to internal
security, reinstatement of civil servants, and reparation pay-
ments to certain opponents of Nazi injustice. The author is
rightly
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critical of these decisions, but he fails to make the case that
the post-war judiciary has on the whole served as a conservative
and thus, for him, an antidemocratic force in German politics.
Actually, the post-war record of the German judiciary in defend-
ing democratic values is probably no better or worse than the
record of the judiciary elsewhere in western Europe or for that
matter in the United States.
Finally, the author calls attention to the fact that Willi
Geiger, a Justice for the Federal Judiciary Court for 26 years
(1961-1977), wrote the 1975 decision that constitutionally
sustained a governmental decree to bar radicals from the public
services, asserting in passing that Geiger served as a prosecutor
of a special court where he "had successfully pleaded for at
least five death sentences" (p. 218). Muller then proceeds
to link the Constitutional Court's anti-radicals decision to the
"undemocratic and authoritarian view" that Geiger
expressed in an essay he wrote as a very young man in 1941. These
remarks are unworthy of the author, for they are as gratuitous as
they are unproven. In support of his charge he cites a virulently
anti- government tract (RECHT, JUSTIZ UND FASCHISMUS NACH 1933
UND HEUTE) published in 1984. He surely must know that such
sources of information, like East Germany's BRAUNBUCH, which he
also frequently cites, lack credibility.
Several things might be said about the author's unfortunate
remark about Justice Geiger. No sources are cited to support the
claim that Geiger authored the Constitutional Court's anti-
radicals opinion. Judicial opinions in Germany are institutional
products. Except for dissenting opinions on the Constitutional
Court authorship of judicial opinions is not a matter of public
record. Secondly, whatever one may think of the prudence or
propriety of the decision in this case, it can be defended in
terms of democratic theory. Third, other justices with impecca-
ble reputations were aligned with Geiger in the majority -- one
was formerly a leading Social Democratic member of the Bundestag
while another was imprisoned by the Nazis for his participation
in the officer's revolt against Hitler. Fourth, as one of its
first appointees Geiger could not have been selected to the
Federal Constitutional Court had he fatally compromised himself
during the Nazi years. Indeed, several of the persons responsi-
ble for his elevation to the Court were imprisoned or persecuted
by the Nazis.
[Finally, Geiger was throughout his years on the Court a close
colleague of Justice Gerhard Leibholz. Owing to his Jewish
ancestry Leibholz, a distinguished professor of law, fled Germany
in 1938. His brother-in-law, the famous Pastor Dietrich
Bonhoffer, was executed by the Nazis in 1945 for his role in the
German resistance. Leibholz, however, was in many ways as
conservative as Geiger, and had he been on the court in 1975 he
would in all probability have voted with Geiger in the radicals
case, as did Leibholz's protege, Justice Hans Justus Rinck, who
succeeded him on the Second Senate. Would Leibholz in that event
have opened himself to the charge of administering Nazi justice?
The very suggestion is preposterous. ]
Geiger himself, a brilliant and respected jurist, has written his
own impressive chapter in the development of West Germany's
constitutional democracy as two Festschrifts dedicated to him in
the last 15 years testify. Apparently three decades of
distinguished service to one of the most vigorous constitutional
democracies in the world is not enough to warrant absolution for
having been in state service during the Nazi era. In Muller's
eyes Willi Geiger continued late in his career to administer Nazi
justice.
None of this is to suggest that West Germany's judicial record is
beyond criticism, or that the German legal profession has fully
come to terms with its past. One only wishes that HITLER'S
JUSTICE had offered the reader a more balanced account of both
the judiciary's role during the Third Reich and West Germany's
record after World War II.
Copyright 1991