Vol. 14 No. 7 (July 2004), pp.567-571

COLLECTIVE INSECURITY:  THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, UNILATERALISM, AND GLOBAL ORDER, by Ikechi Mgbeoji.  University of British Columbia Press, 2004.  200pp. Paper. £16.95 / CDN$ 32.86 / US $24.95.  ISBN: 0774810378.  Hardcover. £53.95 / CDN$ 80 / US $80. ISBN: 077481036X

Reviewed by Ronald C. Slye, Seattle University School of Law.  Email: slye@seattleu.edu

Ikechi Mgbeoji’s COLLECTIVE INSECURITY:  THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, UNILATERALISM, AND GLOBAL ORDER is a timely, well written book that will appeal to those interested in Africa—international lawyers, international relations specialists, and others who are concerned about the impact of the “global war on terrorism” on the role of international law and social justice.  While Mgbeoji does not focus directly on the increased sensitivity of the US and its allies to the threat of terrorism – although he was writing after the intervention in Afghanistan and during the build up to the war in Iraq – the insights and analysis that he derives from the Liberian case study are equally relevant to any serious analysis of that threat and our appropriate response to it. 

COLLECTIVE INSECURITY consists of five chapters.  The first two provide a thorough and accessible history of Liberia and the basic roots that lead to its deterioration in the 1990s.  To explain how Liberia came to devolve to a state requiring outside military intervention, Mgbeoji points to the damaging legacy of colonialism and the Cold War, including the creation of arbitrary political borders by the colonial European powers at the Congress of Berlin, economic exploitation, internalized inferiority, and a model of governance that privileges torture, repression, and a lack of accountability.  He also points to the damage inflicted by corrupt African leaders on their own peoples, coupled with the racism and self-interest of the world’s most powerful states that result in a culture of neglect with respect to Africa.  He provides a nuanced and sophisticated analysis of the interplay of these factors, resisting the all too easy temptation to focus on one cause as dominant in explaining the failure of human rights and democracy in parts of Africa.  The remaining three chapters then analyze the Liberian crisis under existing international law, including the military intervention of a regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  Mgbeoji draws upon the history of that intervention and his analysis of it to reveal important lacunae and risks inherent in the law and practice of the international use of force. 

In taking on all of this in a little less than 150 pages, Mgbeoji runs the risk of skimming the surface.  While COLLECTIVE INSECURITY does succumb to this danger at times – I note below at least one area where I wish he had spent more time – and while experts in African history or international law may take issue with some of his interpretations, there is no question that this is an important book that draws on a [*568] wide variety of sources and disciplines to address both an area that has been neglected for far too long in the US (African politics and history) and an issue that is at the forefront of US foreign policy today (the legitimate use of military force internationally). 

The legitimate use of force was one of the primary concerns of the founders of the United Nations.  The UN Charter embodies this concern in a way that balances a reluctance to sanction the use of force (as most notably articulated in Article 2(4) prohibiting states from using force as a tool of international relations) with a recognition that military options in furtherance of individual or collective self-defense (Article 51) or as authorized by the Security Council (Article 42) are legitimate.  The Liberian intervention by ECOWAS joins a number of recent military involvements – including Iraq, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo – in challenging the existing regime regulating the use of force.  Mgbeoji makes reference to these and other case studies in his analysis of the legality of the Liberian intervention, and draws upon them to critique the current state of international law regulating the use of force. 

Mgboeji concludes that the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia satisfies the formal requirements of international law, but that it raises troubling questions of the wisdom and legitimacy of such actions.  He critically analyzes the three legal arguments used to justify the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia:  collective security, invitation, and regional enforcement action in response to a threat to the peace.  Mgbeoji finds compelling, if troubling, evidence to justify the intervention under each of these arguments. 

The most interesting discussion in the book, and the one that leads Mgbeoji to suggest a number of important reforms, concerns the legality and legitimacy of a regional enforcement action in response to a threat to the peace.  The UN Charter clearly grants to the Security Council the primary authority with respect to threats to international peace and security, but also contemplates some role for regional bodies.  The Liberian intervention raises questions similar to those associated with the NATO action in Kosovo:  does the UN Security Council have to authorize in advance a regional military enforcement action to preserve international peace and security, or may such an intervention be ratified by the Security Council after the fact?  In both cases, Liberia and Kosovo, the Security Council ratified the intervention after the fact.  Mgbeoji concludes that the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was legal, but suffers from serious shortcomings of legitimacy.  This is in contrast to the Independent Commission on Kosovo (headed by the former prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Richard Goldstone), which came to the opposite conclusion with respect to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, concluding that it was “illegal but legitimate.” 

The Liberia and Kosovo stories, of course, differ significantly.  The Security Council failed to act in the case of Kosovo because of the threat of a veto by one of the permanent five members.  The Security Council failed to take up the case of Liberia, on the other hand, because of a lack of interest by any of its [*569] members.  The failure of the Security Council to pay attention to Africa is something that Mgbeoji rightly condemns.  He also cites, among other incidents, the failure of the United Nations to do anything to stop the impending genocide in Rwanda in 1994.  While a greater role for regional bodies may go some way to address this lack of concern, reliance on regional organizations runs the danger of replacing the agenda of a global hegemon with that of a regional hegemon.  Mgbeoji recognizes this, and identifies the problematic nature of the member states that make up ECOWAS – observing that many of them were not in fact democracies, and all had their own domestic serious human rights issues.  Yet Mgbeoji is enough of a realist  not to conclude that regional organizations should satisfy a high standard of legitimacy in order to intervene to stop a genocide or other crime against humanity.  He has in fact argued elsewhere that inaction by regional powers in the face of global indifference to violations in Africa is a recipe for continued oppression (Mgbeoji 2004).  Regional intervention, while problematic, may be the only option in the near term.

Mgbeoji differs with the Kosovo Commission in asserting that there is no legal reason why the Security Council cannot ratify a regional military intervention after the fact.  It is a conclusion that makes him uncomfortable.  Such a system of post-hoc authorization encourages more powerful states to use force without seeking international support in advance, the assumption being that such support can be lobbied for and acquired afterwards.  He rightfully cautions that, if frequent, such a practice will undermine the general idea that the use of force internationally should be rare and undertaken only when there is a consensus that a threat to international peace and security exists.

Mgbeoji makes a number of important recommendations arising from his analysis of the Liberian intervention.  Like many others, he calls for the elimination of the veto power held by the five permanent members of the Security Council.  He also suggests reforming the membership of the Security Council to ensure a greater sensitivity to the needs of all regions of the world.  Removing the veto power will assist this by forcing the more powerful states to pay more attention to the concerns of the weaker states.  Mgbeoji also recommends that regional bodies either be given some form of representation on, or access to, the Council when regional events warrant Council involvement.  These are all sensible proposals.  Given the interests of the five permanent members who each jealously guard their veto power, there is unfortunately little prospect in the short and even medium term that such sensible proposals will be taken seriously.

More realistically, Mgbeoji calls for the codification of rules governing military intervention.  While codification does not translate immediately into legal reform or other practical effects, it is a necessary step for such changes.  Mgbeoji makes the following suggestions concerning the content of a codification of rules governing military intervention.  First, Security Council approval must be acquired in advance and not after the fact.  Second, no [*570] regional organization should intervene unless there is already an effective cease fire in place.  Third, there should be a clear distinction between members of the peacekeeping forces and the members of the parties to the conflict.  In the Liberian case, confusion among the parties to the conflict and the regional peacekeeping troops led to a high casualty rate among all the parties.  Fourth, the intervening force must be clearly neutral with respect to the conflict.  The danger of regional intervention, again evident in the Liberian case, is that it may provide a cover for furthering the interests of a regional hegemonic power.  Fifth, any regional enforcement must be ultimately subject to the authority of the Security Council.  All of these recommendations make eminent sense, and would probably receive fairly wide support.  His sixth recommendation will probably be viewed as the most controversial, but it is crucial for the effective functioning of the other five recommendations.  The sixth, and last, recommendation is that the international community dedicate itself to securing “social distributive justice” globally, for without such justice any claims to collective security will be viewed with suspicion. Unfortunately, Mgbeoji does not elaborate on what he has in mind with respect to social distributive justice, nor does he give any clear guidance on how to proceed to realize such a goal.  I suspect that Mgbeoji would agree that we should not wait for its attainment before allowing any actions of collective defense, as he earlier suggests that we should not impose too high a standard on the human rights practices of regional states who agree to intervene to stop genocide or other crimes against humanity.  It is unfortunate that he does not elaborate more on this recommendation. 

In the end, Mgbeoji left me with a desire for more discussion of many of the issues he discusses only in passing.  In addition to a further elaboration on his recommendation that a commitment to distributive justice precede claims based on collective security, I also wanted to know more about his views on how to increase governmental legitimacy in Africa.  He rightly dismisses the tendency of some in the West to equate democracy with elections.  He also persuasively argues that any effort to increase the legitimacy of African governments must take into account, and draw upon, “indigenous and time proven methods of legitimate governance.”  Rather than discussing this in greater depth, he calls upon scholars of African political instability to focus on the crucial question of how to meld such indigenous African institutions with the positive Western values of democracy and accountability.  I hope that Mgbeoji will take up his own challenge, and that his next work will delve deeper into a topic that he has rightly identified as crucial to the future of human rights and governmental legitimacy on not only the African continent, but also the rest of the world.

At one point Mgbeoji quotes from Louis Henkin to the effect that, in the contemporary era, international law “will be importantly influenced by the Third World.”  With scholarship like Mgbeoji’s concerning the lessons of Liberia, this prediction may well prove to be true.  [*571]

REFERENCES:

Mgbeoji, Ikechi. 2004.  Book Review. 15 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 218-225.

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Copyright 2004 by the author, Ronald C. Slye.