BREACH OF TRUST: HOW THE WARREN COMMISSION FAILED THE NATION AND WHY

Vol. 16 No.5 (May, 2006), pp.341-343

BREACH OF TRUST: HOW THE WARREN COMMISSION FAILED THE NATION AND WHY, by Gerald D. McKnight. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005. 512pp. Cloth. $29.95. ISBN: 0-7006-1390-0.

Reviewed by David A. Yalof, Department of Political Science, The University of Connecticut. E-mail: david.yalof [at] uconn.edu.

More than four decades after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, books on the subject are published every year, and new facts continue to be revealed. Just when it seems like there’s nothing left to learn, some work of scholarship defies the odds. In 1995 Gerald Posner’s CASE CLOSED provided the most persuasive argument yet in favor of the lone gunman theory. Clearly there is a large readership for books such as these, and publishers know it. Nonetheless, from the standpoint of producing important scholarship, the burden remains squarely on authors who write in this heavily mined area to justify why yet another book on the subject is necessary.

In BREACH OF TRUST: HOW THE WARREN COMMISSION FAILED THE NATION AND WHY, Gerald McKnight justifies finding a place for his new book within the vast Kennedy assassination literature. First, his focus is narrower than that of most previous studies: he sets his targets only on the Warren Commission, its inner workings, and its relationship with the branches of government. By some informed opinions, the last comprehensive book to focus on the Warren Commission was Harold Weisberg’s WHITEWASH, which was published in 1965. Second, by never straying from the position that the Warren Commission was established for the sole purpose of confirming the FBI’s lone gunman theory, McKnight brings some new shine on old data that have been available to the public for more than 30 years. Finally, without speculating as to the motives of individual commission members, McKnight manages to expose the political bias that infiltrated so much of the Warren Commission’s methods. In fact, he walks this tightrope extremely well. Add to the above the fact that the book is extremely well written, and it is not so hard to justify yet another new work addressing the aftermath of JFK’s assassination.

Among assassination buffs, McKnight must fend off at least one key criticism: he appears to have written his book with the end already clear in his mind – that the commission was established for the sole purpose of confirming the FBI’s findings as quickly as possible. Offering this conclusion up front, he then marshals a wealth of evidence to confirm it. After reviewing the circumstances that led to the creation of the commission, the book considers in turn all the troubling circumstances and so-called “smoking guns” that should have given the Warren Commission considerable pause during its deliberations: accusations that Oswald was an FBI agent, the rushed autopsy, the “single bullet” fabrication, and so on. The discussion of evidence before the commission and the way commissioners [*342] sidestepped it is meticulous and exquisitely detailed. Those who are not assassination buffs might want to keep a glossary and timeline at their side as they read this book, so that they can keep straight all the facts as they are unveiled. Meanwhile, for those who wish to rely on McKnight for their own research, his book is well documented and chock full of citations. In the back of the book there are 100 pages of footnotes and appendices.

Perhaps the most engaging stories in the text depict the various antagonisms that existed among key players, including most notably the conflicts between the commission members and FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover. The commissioners wanted the FBI to cooperate; Hoover wanted the commissioners to follow “the script” and cooperate in a different way. In the end, Hoover got what he wanted. And yet the script that was followed was so poorly constructed that it continues to reflect negatively on both the FBI and the Warren Commission in the annals of American history.

Whether or not McKnight’s argument is bulletproof, it certainly provides him with a device for reconsidering some of the more interesting aspects of the Commission. For example, it seems clear that the resistance President Johnson first met while recruiting Chief Justice Earl Warren and Senator Richard Russell played right into the president’s hands: as unwilling participants, the two most important commissioners would be far less likely to shake the boat and disrupt momentum in favor of the lone gunman theory. (In the end Russell tried to dissent from the single bullet premise, but his two prepared reports were quietly purged from the commission’s record). McKnight lays out the evidence pointing to House Minority Leader Gerald Ford’s role as an informant of the Commission’s deliberations for the FBI. Although the Commission was ably staffed by top-flight prosecutors, it did not have experts on the Mafia, Cuba, or other key subjects, forcing its members to rely on the FBI for such information. Finally, McKnight reveals how the commission members put up with numerous procedural irregularities so that they could move as swiftly as possible to the conclusion that Oswald had acted alone.

Judged as a general interest book about the Kennedy Assassination, BREACH OF TRUST certainly has a lot to offer. Judged as a work of political science, the book might benefit from some additional data and evidence to frame the discussion. After initially rejecting the idea of a commission, President Johnson eventually came around to the idea because the commission’s existence would provide substantial leverage for ending other inquiries and investigations by Congress (p.32). J. Edgar Hoover favored the appointment of a commission for the same reason. A similar thought process led President Richard Nixon to approve the appointment of a special prosecutor during the Watergate affair 10 years later. But is this type of reasoning sound?

McKnight never really addresses the nature of the political circumstances that produce these types of commissions in general. Nor does he provide any [*343] history of such commission-like bodies. Had they been used before? If so, had they worked? Perhaps there are certain circumstances in which commissions effectively serve the function of deflecting other investigations; at other times, however, a commission may stoke the fire of controversy more than it diffuses it.

McKnight further argues that the Warren Commission was never intended to serve as a “truth commission” or an independent investigative body – its job was to “evaluate the FBI’s investigation and report their findings to the American people.” If that is the case, it becomes harder to criticize the Warren Commission for not engaging in more aggressive methods that would have gotten to the bottom of the assassination. At several points in the text he takes the commission to task for failing in its obligation to investigate certain controversial aspects of the Kennedy assassination. But was this really an obligation at all? To properly evaluate McKnight’s conclusions, political scientists might benefit from some discussion of the nature of the charges made to the commission, and the criteria by which such success or failures should be measured.

Finally, BREACH OF TRUST provides readers with a window into a different political era. At a minimum, it reminds us of just how much prestige the media enjoyed in Washington, D.C. political circles during the 1960s, and by implication how much it has lost since that period. McKnight reveals how key figures from the Washington Post and The New York Times helped convinced the FBI and President Johnson that the FBI report could not stand on its own, as the political left would not believe it, and the FBI could not write the report well enough to satisfy most people. They were right on both counts; unfortunately for those in charge, the Warren Commission proved no better a salesman of the lone gunman theory.

Most reviews of books about the Kennedy Assassination end on the somewhat wistful note that despite the noble efforts of the author, we will never know what really happened in Dallas’ Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963. This book is no different from scores of other books in that regard. Still, thanks to McKnight’s excellent work, at least we now have a little more of a clue as to why we will never know what really happened. And that is at least some measure of progress.

REFERENCES:

Posner, Gerald. 1995. CASE CLOSED. New York, N.Y.: Random House.

Weisberg, Harold. 1965. WHITEWASH: THE REPORT ON THE WARREN REPORT. New York: Dell Publishing.

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