Language Rights and Political Theory.

Vol. 14 No. 8 (August 2004), pp.630-633

LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND POLITICAL THEORY, by Will Kymlicka and Alan Patten (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 368pp. Hardback. £57.50 / $85.00. ISBN: 019926290X. Paperback. £20.00 / $24.95. ISBN: 0199262918.

Reviewed by Rory O’Connell, Human Rights Centre, Law School, Queen’s University of Belfast. Email: r.oconnell@qub.ac.uk

This is a thoughtful collection of essays on a longstanding issue which has only recently come under legal and political analysis: how do we manage political and social arrangements when we do not all speak the same language? Kymlicka and Patten have brought together a range of experts to discuss this key question. The result is a collection of diverse views which will provide much to ponder for anyone interested in questions of language rights, minority rights, and very basic questions of justice such as the fair distribution of burdens, the “free rider” problem, the functioning of democracy, the pursuit of a common good, and equality.

Kymlicka’s and Patten’s excellent introduction outlines the factors which have lead to a resurgent interest in language: the collapse of communist dictatorships, the rise of regionalism and nationalism, immigration, the development of supranational institutions and the need to protect indigenous peoples (pp.3-10). Yet the roots of linguistic problems themselves are much older than these recent reasons for looking at language and include processes of nation-building (p. 37), the development of literacy (Levy, p. 230), empire and decolonisation (May, p.130; Blake, p. 222).

The reader is struck with the ubiquity and diversity of language related problems in the world. The contributors discuss or refer to cases in Quebec, Catalonia, Scandinavia, Ghana, India, South Africa, Turkey, and indeed at the European and world levels.

The issues are very diverse. They include: how should we respond to the threatened disappearance of half of the world’s languages (Boran, p.189; Levy, p.236; Blake, p.210)? should a nearly dead language be resuscitated? in what circumstance should a minority language be declared an official language (Blake, p.224)? when should public services, or education be provided in minority languages? should recent immigrant communities have the same linguistic rights as long-standing national minorities? does the worldwide dominance of English mean English native speakers should compensate others who must learn English as a second language (Van Parijs, p.153)? are special measures necessary to protect English speakers who find themselves in a minority in a given territory (Rubio-Marin, p.60)? should facility in the State’s majority language be pursued and at what cost (Rubio-Marin, pp.68-73; Pogge, p.105)? how should the European Union cope with all the languages spoken within its borders (p. 9)? And so on.

Discussion of language rights has often been obscured according to several of [*631] the contributors. This may be due to the role played by political philosophers from countries perceived as monolingual (p.7) and the failure of experts from the different disciplines of international relations, law, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, and the like, to talk to each other (Grin, p.173). Stephen May provides an historically informed analysis of critical impediments to a full understanding of linguistic issues. Among other points, he discusses the temptation to sanitise history—e.g. ignoring the historical diversity of languages in America and the elimination of Native American languages (pp.129-131)—and the tendency to assert historical inevitability of the dominance of the majority language (although in many cases this may have been deliberately constructed and imposed). Disputes about the empirical data also bedevil discussion on language rights (see the disagreement as to whether bilingual education harms or benefits overall life chances, and compare May (p.144) with Laitin and Reich (p.94)).

Neither history nor empirical data can decisively resolve normative questions, and the gem of this collection is the variety of normative approaches it offers up in debate. There are a few recurring key points. One central point identified by Kymlicka and reiterated throughout the collection is that, when it comes to language, the State cannot be neutral. Even the most minimal of States must speak in its laws, public services, commands, and to do this it must choose one or more language(s) which will inevitably put some people at a disadvantage. “Benign neglect” is not an option (Weinstock, p.251). There is also some broad agreement that languages are important both for instrumental reasons (to access services, to contribute to a public democratic debate, and so on) and for non-instrumental reasons of identity and culture. There is very considerable disagreement as to the weight to be attached to each and the implications which follow.

One of the early contributions to the book argues for what the editors label a process-based approach. Laitin and Reich would support any language policy provided it is arrived at democratically and respects liberal rights of autonomy (pp.92-104). This approach has appeal in that it avoids a simple response to the very heterogeneous range of language issues, respects the rights of any language speakers who do not wish to preserve their language, and respects democratic debate (though one has to wonder in what language debate should occur). Somewhat more guidance is offered by Weinstock, adopting a Rawlsian approach, who argues that a just language policy should not engage in the symbolic promotion of any language, should be prepared to revise its decisions about language policy, and most critically, should engage in a minimalist manner with language only taking decisions when necessary to achieve its legitimate polices (p.268). Such process-based approaches need to be, at the least, supplemented with a more detailed account of justice-based restraints on the democratic process, and/or an account of the public goods at which democratic deliberation should aim.

Considerably more guidance, though, is offered by those contributors who identify a public or common good to be [*632] promoted. Perhaps needless to say, there is no agreement as to what the good to be pursued is! For some, the good to be pursued is the preservation of languages, as intrinsically valuable human accomplishments (Réaume, p.283). Linguistic preservation and diversity might be justified as a good for reasons of aesthetic appreciation, the possibility that minority languages may offer scientific or other utilitarian benefits, and to provide a range of cultural choices for individuals (Boran, drawing on biodiversity models, pp.193-198). For one policy-maker the public good might be the maintenance of diversity itself, on the basis that diversity enriches society (Grin). This leads to recommendations that, all other things being equal, policy-makers should favour decisions which promote diversity (Grin, p.185). It also allows for a principled explanation why, in at least some cases, states may be justified in giving more rights to languages of national minorities, than immigrant communities, on the grounds that the former languages are more likely to disappear and thus reduce diversity (Grin, p.185).

Whilst these good-based arguments point to the preservation of languages and the maintenance of diversity, others identify a different public good to be pursued. Van Parijs sees a public good in the existence of a common language (often a second language for most speakers), which allows people to communicate with each other. Being a public good this requires that those who benefit from its existence without any effort find some way to compensate those who have to learn it as a second language. Otherwise English speakers would effectively be “free riders,” enjoying a public good without contributing to it. Van Parijs offers several formulae which might be used to determine the amount of compensation, and suggests ways in which it might be provided. Yet others would endorse, explicitly or otherwise, goals which do not lead to bilingualism or multiple languages. Thomas Pogge would see as a main public goal the development of fluency in the dominant language as essential to ensuring that everyone has equal life chances in a given society—though this does not mean a society should denigrate or seek the elimination of second languages. This goal stems from a justice-based consideration, to promote the best interests of every child in a given society.

These process and public good based arguments necessarily interrelate with questions of justice: assuming that there are goods to be pursued, what justice-based constraints might be imposed on them (e.g. Boran, p.208). Or, for that matter, what are the limits on the outcomes of democratic debate? How should the burdens of pursuing public goods be fairly distributed?

Several contributors agree that coercive processes of assimilation must be prohibited by principles of justice, but that non-coerced language change must be allowed as a matter of justice (Levy, p.249). Blake argues that our real concern with language politics is to avoid oppression in all its guises, including the current effects of past oppression (pp.222, 228). Historical injustice may even ground a claim to granting official language status to a minority language (p.224). Apart from the possibility of oppression and discrimination, liberals have no justice-based reason to be worried about [*633] language loss. For Blake, this still leaves us with morally difficult decisions about whether to support a language in difficulty due to past injustices or allow it to die in the name of liberal respect (p.229). Other justice-based approaches are pressed into argument. Rubio-Marin suggests that language rights should be protected as integral to other rights—i.e. the rights to education, to vote, to health care, entail a right to enjoy them in a language one can understand (p.65).

Rubio-Marin also invokes the principles of non-discrimination (p.63), and the related but possibly wider notion of equality permeates several of the contributions. May stresses the need for substantive equality, in recognising that majority language speakers enjoy implicit, “normalized” benefits, in that public discourse is conducted in their native tongue. The State should endeavour to provide some balance against this structural inequality (p.142). Pogge, though he disagrees with several of the justice-based arguments for recognizing minority language rights (pp.108-113), agrees that minority language speakers may be able to invoke the right to equal treatment (pp.113-115). Patten returns to this point in his concluding essay, adopting the notion that the State should be “even-handed” in its language policy, to avoid the unfairness of the majority language speakers having their culture reinforced as a matter of course (pp.316-317). Such accommodation though needs to be on a “where numbers warrant” and proportionate basis. Patten suggests that this is based on the need to protect people’s non-instrumental interest in language as a marker identity, but also indicates his own belief that the instrumental use of language for purposes such as democratic deliberation may be more important (p.318).

In conclusion, this book, though focussed on the questions of language policies, offers perspectives not just on these pressing issues, but also on wider questions of political philosophy, including the fair distribution of burdens and the conditions of democracy, and questions of equality. The collection encourages us (certainly the monoglots and native English speakers among us) to examine more carefully the realities of politics and history behind the apparent inevitable dominance of any given majority language, and to ponder the demanding requirements of equality.

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