Vol. 21 No. 3
(March, 2011) pp.117-122
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS, by Heinz Klug. Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2010. 311pp.
Paper. $32.00/£16.95.
ISBN: 9781841137377.
Reviewed by Theunis Roux,
Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales. Email: t.roux [at] unsw.edu.au.
Ten years ago, with the
publication of CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY (Klug 2000), Heinz Klug gave us one of the
best accounts yet written of the causes and nature of South Africa’s transition
to democracy. In carefully crafted
prose he explained how first the 1993 and then the 1996 Constitutions were
forged out of a dynamic interaction between South Africa’s tradition of
democratic struggle and the available constitutional models in “international
political culture.” Admirers of
that book will find Klug’s latest offering, a “contextual analysis” of the 1996
South African Constitution, somewhat less ambitious in design and more
workmanlike in execution. Reprising
some of the themes developed in the earlier work, Klug on this occasion does not
attempt to blend them into a coherent whole, and declines to offer a firm view
on whether South Africa’s constitutional democracy is living up to international
and local expectations.
The more open-ended approach
adopted in the current book is no doubt attributable to the nature of the series
for which it was written, Hart Publishing’s CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
(under the general editorship of Peter Leyland and Andrew Harding).
The blurb for the series declares its aim as being to “provide scholars
and students with accessible introductions to the constitutional systems of the
world, supplying both a road map for the novice and, at the same time, a deeper
understanding of the key historical, political and legal events which have
shaped the constitutional landscape of each country.”
These are fairly modest goals, and Klug’s contribution to the series
easily achieves them. The emphasis
on accessibility, however, has produced a book that references very little of
the scholarly literature on comparative judicial politics and gives a largely
descriptive account of the major constitutional developments in South Africa
after the transition to democracy in 1994.
The looser structure starts with
Klug’s introductory remarks on his central theme, the notion of a “contextual
analysis.” No definition of this
term is provided, nor is there any real statement of the scholarly purpose
behind this approach. As the
discussion progresses, it becomes clear that by “context” what Klug means is
something like social issue rather than the political and institutional context
for judicial review in South Africa.
Even then, however, his list of five issues, which Klug says “incorporate
five general themes” (p.2), are somewhat different in kind and thus difficult to
ascribe to any particular theoretical or conceptual framework.
They comprise: “the legacies of colonialism and apartheid; pervasive
social problems, such as crime, gender [*118] relations and HIV/AIDS; legal
pluralism; aspiration for a rights-based culture; and democratic governance”
(p.2). Absent a definition, it is
hard to grasp what makes these issues contextual or what connects them to each
other. Why these five and not any
other five? All that we are told is
that “[e]ach of these categories covers a number of specific issues, and will
enable a general discussion of the ways in which the [1996 South African]
Constitution – through its creation of institutions, allocation of power, and
proclamation of rights – attempts to address the past and construct a future
society that transcends the often desperate, violent, unequal and unforgiving
realities of the present” (p.2). As
academic prose goes this is all quite adequate, but it lacks the clarity of
analytic purpose that marked Klug’s earlier book.
What conception of “context,”
for example, could connect the last two issues to the first three?
As a social phenomenon, the “aspiration for a rights-based culture” is at
once harder to pin down than the hard facts of crime and disease and more akin
to the chosen constitutional means through which these social problems are to be
addressed. The same is true of
“democratic governance.” If both
this and “the legacies of colonialism and racism” are contextual issues, then
the term ceases to have a precise analytic meaning.
In any case, none of the five listed issues is specifically addressed in
the book. Rather, the book is
structured around a fairly conventional narrative progression from the history
of the making of the 1996 South African Constitution (Chapters 2-4) to the
performance of its major institutions: Parliament (Chapter 6), the executive
(Chapter 7) and the courts (Chapter 8).
In the end, it seems, the reference to “contextual analysis” is just
Klug’s way of signaling his intention to supplement his discussion of legal
doctrine with a more sociological treatment of the Constitution in its
historical and social context. This
is, of course, a perfectly legitimate “law and society” approach.
Once the comfort zone of pure doctrinal analysis is abandoned, however,
some other analytic framework needs to be put in its place.
And this is what the book lacks.
From some of the chapter
sub-headings and a few scattered passages in the text it would appear that, had
Klug not been burdened by his series brief, he might have wanted to respond in
more detail to the most significant book on South Africa’s democratic transition
to appear since his own earlier work, Jens Meierhenrich’s THE LEGACIES OF LAW
(Meierhenrich 2008). The argument
of Meierhenrich’s book runs in many ways contrary to Klug’s account in
CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY. Reviving
Ernst Fraenkel’s all-but-forgotten concept of the dual state (Fraenkel 1941),
Meierhenrich attributes the confidence placed in law by the main players in
South Africa’s negotiated transition to the long-run institutional effects of
the “normative state” that existed alongside the “prerogative state” in
apartheid South Africa. As he puts
it: “the memory of formally rational law ... created the conditions for the
emergence of trust between democracy-demanding and democracy-resisting elites”
(2008, p.4).
Although Meierhenrich at one
point cites Klug’s account of the transition as [*119] though it were compatible
with his own, the two are in fact in tension with each other.
In his earlier book, as noted earlier, Klug attributed the confidence
placed by South Africans in a judicially enforced constitutional pact to the
ascendancy of this model in “international political culture.”
In so doing, he expressly rejected the findings of a study by Ellmann
(1995) to the effect that black South Africans, despite the instrumental use of
law under apartheid, retained some residual faith in the independence of the
judiciary and the rule of law. For
Klug (2000, p.47), “[g]iven the degree to which law and the judicial system were
implicated in the construction and daily functioning of the apartheid system,”
this argument is unconvincing, and the conclusions Ellmann draws from his study
“strained” (2000, p.45). Rather,
“the key to understanding the ‘new faith’ in the judiciary must be sought in the
particular dynamics of the democratic transition” (p.47). Meierhenrich, by
contrast, quotes extensively from Ellmann’s study and uses it as an important
plank in his argument. Indeed,
Meierhenrich’s book can be read as an extended, more theoretically ambitious
version of Ellmann’s study.
Given this divergence of views,
it would have been interesting to know what Klug thought of Meierhenrich’s
argument. Instead, what we get in
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS is a tentative parry
rather than a full-blooded riposte.
Subsection IV of Chapter 1 is thus enticingly headed “Conclusion: Context,
Continuity and the Problem of Path Dependency.”
The single page Klug devotes to this topic, however, fails to engage with
Meierhenrich’s argument in any detail.
“Notions of legal continuity and theories of path dependency,” Klug
writes, “may account, in part, for the role of law in South African society.
Yet it is important to understand the law and the Constitution as parts
of a broader historical and social context” (p.22).
Well, yes, but proponents of the path dependency argument would hardly
deny the importance of the “broader historical and social context,” and thus
there is no real joinder of issue here.
Chapter 3 contains a similarly
promising sub-heading, “Legacies, Legal Traditions and the Limits of Path
Dependency” (p.59). On this
occasion, Meierhenrich’s book is not even mentioned in the text, despite the
apparently deliberate reference to its title.
Rather, the section consists, first, of an account of the four major
documents on human rights produced by the African National Congress before the
transition, and then a discussion contrasting the last of these documents with
the South African Law Commission’s Interim Report on Group and Human Rights.
While illustrating Klug’s point that the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions
emerged out of South Africa’s tradition of democratic struggle, the path
dependency argument is sidestepped rather than confronted head on.
The following sentence is typical: “As much as theories of path
dependency emphasize that prior choices and events do not simply determine the
future but might rather constrain future institutional and policy choices in
particular ways, the constitutional product of the democratic transition in
South Africa does not guarantee a transformed society but rather facilitates and
hinders particular options within the [*120] realm of democratic contestation”
(p.59). Once again, proponents of
the path dependency argument would probably not wish to dispute the second part
of this sentence, and thus it is unclear what contrast Klug is trying to draw.
He obviously finds the proposition that apartheid law might have had some
enduring beneficial influence on South Africa’s democratic transition deficient
in some way, but he does not at any point tell us why this proposition, however
irksome, might not at the same time be true.
Chapter 8 subsection IV, titled,
“Strategic Engagement and Judicial Pragmatism”, is another section that promises
much but does not in the end deliver.
Situated in a chapter on the “Constitutional Role of the Courts”, the
section provided an opportunity for Klug to relate some of the mainly American
literature on the strategic model of judicial behavior to the South African
Constitutional Court. None of this
literature is cited, however.
Instead, the bulk of the section (pp.243-45) is devoted to a discussion of the
two so-called Certification Judgments, in which the Constitutional Court
reviewed the conformance of the 1996 Constitution to the Constitutional
Principles contained in a schedule to the 1993 Constitution.
While the first of these decisions, which returned the Constitution to
the Constitutional Assembly for amendment, was indeed a remarkable decision,
Klug’s discussion of it hangs in the air somewhat – its connection to any
overarching thesis unclear. As Klug
writes, “[t]he significance of the certification judgments ... lies in the
degree to which the Constitutional Court was able to assert itself as the
protector of constitutional democracy” (p.245).
Indeed. But that
statement cries out for an explanation.
How was it that the Court was able to pull off this difficult assignment
with such seeming ease? Why did the
major political parties accept its decision with so little protest?
What was it about the political context for judicial review in South
Africa or the strategies deployed by the Court that could explain this result?
Earlier in this section Klug
writes: “While the Court has achieved a remarkable degree of legitimacy and
acceptance of its authority in the first decade and a half of its existence,
continuing controversy over judicial appointments and even disappointment over
its limited acceptance of direct applications and some constitutional claims,
keeps the question of its legitimacy and authority alive” (p.243).
The first part of this sentence contradicts the findings of a study that
Klug himself cites 14 pages earlier in which it was reported that diffuse public
support for the Constitutional Court in 1996-1997 stood at 27.9% (Gibson and
Caldeira 2003). If this figure,
which showed little change in a follow-up study (Gibson 2008), is accurate, the
Constitutional Court’s achievement in the Certification Judgments becomes even
more remarkable. Here is a Court,
it would seem, that is able to secure compliance with its decisions and the
support of all major political parties without building its institutional
legitimacy. Once again, this fact
cries out for an explanation, or at least for clarification through the use of
more clearly defined conceptual vocabulary.
This example illustrates the
difficulty of writing introductory texts that are aimed both at students and at
comparative [*121] scholars unfamiliar with the country being discussed.
In an effort to keep the analysis clear and simple, statements can
sometimes be made that could prove misleading.
A further illustration of this difficulty comes in Klug’s discussion of
the so-called “Hlophe saga” (pp.236-37).
There is insufficient space to rehearse the whole of this sorry episode
in South Africa’s constitutional history in detail.
Suffice it to say that it involved a complaint by the judges of the
Constitutional Court against a lower-court judge that he had attempted to
interfere in one of their decisions in relation to the since abandoned
corruption proceedings brought against Jacob Zuma (now, but not at the time,
President of South Africa). The
Constitutional Court judges’ handling of the complaint, rightly or wrongly,
exposed them to tremendous public criticism, and politicized the judicial
process to a potentially destabilizing degree.
The episode ended with a controversial decision by the Judicial Services
Commission (JSC) that the evidence presented by each side was inconclusive, and
therefore that a formal hearing was not required.
The controversy surrounding this decision stemmed from the fact that it
was taken before the Constitutional Court judges’ evidence, and the lower-court
judge’s evidence in reply, had been subjected to cross-examination.
Most commentators were of the view that there was a sufficient disparity
between the two versions of what happened to warrant further examination and
that, if the allegations brought by the Constitutional Court judges had been
proven, the lower-court judge ought to have been removed from office.
After recounting the basic facts
of this episode, Klug offers the throw-away remark that the JSC’s decision
“averted a constitutional crisis” and “paradoxically, strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by making it quite difficult to remove a sitting
judge” (p.237). This is a
provocative interpretation of the JSC’s decision, to say the least.
It requires us to set aside all aspects of the episode barring the
supposed precedential effect of the JSC’s decision, and then to understand the
precedent set by that decision (such as it was), as contributing to the
strengthening of judicial independence.
Perhaps, with a lot more substantiation, a convincing argument to this
effect could be made out. Left
unsubstantiated, this reading of the episode is misleadingly superficial.
If the allegations against the lower-court judge were indeed
well-founded, his actions brought the judiciary into disrepute.
Removing this kind of judge from office could only have had the effect of
restoring public confidence in the judiciary, with knock-on consequences for the
strengthening of judicial independence.
Equally, if the Constitutional Court judges lodged the complaint without
good reason, they acted improperly, and the South African public had a right to
know this. Instead of clarifying
the issue one way or the other, the JSC’s decision left the truth of the
Constitutional Court judges’ allegations untested, and consequently cast a
shadow over the integrity of all concerned.
How this result may be said to have strengthened judicial independence is
far from clear. The far more likely
consequence of the JSC’s decision is that the executive will now find it easier
to justify interfering with the powers and functions of the all too [*122]
fallible men and women who staff the judicial branch.
The strength of Klug’s book lies
in the emphasis it places on constitutional history.
More than one third of the book, by my reckoning, is devoted to
discussing the political developments and debates that preceded the drafting of
the 1996 South African Constitution.
As he did in CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY, Klug here draws extensively on his
personal knowledge of the constitution-making process.
These pages consequently carry the authority of an insider’s account.
Without a clear analytic framework, however, the detail recorded in these
pages is all just so much information: useful for those not already familiar
with this material, but unhelpful to those who want to know more about what the
South African case has to teach about the “global expansion of judicial power”
(Tate and Vallinder 1995). For
those lessons, Klug’s earlier work and Meierhenrich’s interesting alternative
account are the books to read. On
the other hand, if what you’re looking for is a concise and up-to-date account
of the major constitutional developments in South Africa since 1994, this book,
despite its faults, is probably the best thing on the market.
REFERENCES:
Ellmann, Stephen.
1995. “Law and Legitimacy in
South Africa.” LAW AND SOCIAL
INQUIRY 20: 407-79.
Fraenkel, Ernst.
1941. THE DUAL STATE: A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF DICTATORSHIP.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Gibson, James L. and Gregory A.
Caldeira. 2003.
“Defenders of Democracy?
Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South African Constitutional Court.”
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 65: 1-30.
Gibson, James L.
2008. “The Evolving
Legitimacy of the South African Constitutional Court.”
In François du Bois and Antje du Bois-Pedain, eds.
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 229-66.
Klug, Heinz.
2000.
CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH
AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Meierhenrich, Jens.
2008.
THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA,
1652-2000. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Tate, C. Neal and Torbjörn
Vallinder, eds. 1995.
THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER.
New York: New York University Press.
*********************
© Copyright 2011 by the author, Theunis Roux.