VOL. 6 NO. 10 (October, 1996) pp. 141-44.
COURTS, LAW , AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE by Herbert
Jacob, Erhard Blankenburg, Herbert M. Kritzer, Doris Marie
Provine, Joseph Sanders. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
$45 cloth, $20.00 paper.
Reviewed by: Susan Sterett, University of Denver.
Courts and lawyers have been a significant part of governance
throughout western industrialized states, but the American
scholarship on courts and lawyers has tended to focus largely on
American courts. That has led to skewed perspectives in a variety
of subfields within political science. At the risk of
oversimplifying, I'd like to outline the difficulties that the
lack of attention to the politics of other legal systems has led
to, even if the only purpose of study is to understand the
American system, which it should not be. Stating the problem with
the limits on attention to politics of legal systems will
illuminate why collections such as Jacob, Blankenburg, Kritzer,
Provine and Sanders are important.
Within public law, when gestures toward comparison have been
made, they have sometimes been little more than gestures that
have tended to reaffirm American assumptions about the
distinctive importance of the American legal system. So, for
example, it has often been possible to state that American courts
are more "activist," or involved in politicized
decisions because the United States has the power of judicial
review and a written constitution to interpret that is unlike
that of any other state. Such a perspective makes no sense of the
rather extensive constitutionalist review that has been
significant in postwar Europe. Furthermore, it ignores all that
goes on in courts that does not depend on or require
constitutionalist review, including the handling of divorce and
family law issues, personal injury and crimes.
Within comparative politics, courts have historically largely
been ignored, sometimes with the justification that courts have
been irrelevant to the questions of political development and
public policy that most often concern political scientists.
Hard-headed approaches have also held that because courts have
neither purse nor sword, they cannot engage other major political
institutions. The cost of that has been an inability to
incorporate into political analysis the constitutionalist
politics, both domestic and supranational, that have provided
major points for political dispute in western states. An
unwillingness to examine legal institutions systematically and
comparatively has, therefore, impoverished our understanding both
of American politics and of politics abroad. These complaints,
common to those who work in comparative law and politics, are
finally starting to become outdated as monographs, edited
collections and symposia in journals have begun to appear. When
attempts to synthesize work and frame it for students begin to
appear, the possibility that the field is actually a field rather
than a hope a few individual scholars have becomes real.
This book recognizes the beginning status of the field,
identifying the book's purpose as two-fold: to provoke further
research in the field and to educate students (pp. 3-4). Each
author addresses a different state in separate chapters: Herbert
Jacob discusses the United States, Herbert Kritzer discusses the
United Kingdom, Doris Marie Provine writes about France, Erhard
Blankenburg discusses Germany, and Joseph Sanders addresses
Japan. Most chapters tell several stories to state and illustrate
basic themes about the legal system. Because it has chapters on
individual states, it is not as American-centered as a
comprehensive text for American students can so easily be.
Furthermore, while constitutionalist review looms large, as it so
often does, each chapter also attends to basics of court
structure within the national states they study. They also
address the organization of criminal courts and the handling of
personal injury claims.
The essays in this collection run loosely in parallel. In a
thoughtful and useful introductory essay, Herbert Jacob
explicitly discusses the difficulties of determining what is to
be compared and how they are to be compared. An interest in
systematic comparison tends to lead analysts toward variables
that seem easily compared cross-nationally, such as background
characteristics of judges or appeal rates in courts. Such
analysis makes the basis of comparison explicit, but the
different contexts and the possibility that the variables are
differently significant cross-nationally usually remains
unexplored. More holistic case studies attendant to context more
clearly reveal the national significance of the material under
discussion, but can make the basis of comparison difficult.
In his introductory chapter, Herbert Jacob outlines comparative
issues. He argues that courts make policy and serve social
control and legitimation functions, and that each chapter will
address those themes. While the themes are broadly enough defined
that indeed each chapter does address them, they are broadly
enough defined that the chapters have substantial room to depart
from them, as Jacob acknowledges (pp.11-14). This book emphasizes
a holistic and contextualized approach (pp.3-4).
The chapters rely on stories to get points across. Some stories
highlight issues within the legal system. Herbert Jacob discusses
the criminal justice system in the United States by taking the
reader through a case. In his chapter on Britain, Herbert Kritzer
provides stories to illustrate the significance of judicial
review, which is largely procedural overview of administrative
action and which has been significant in creating a sense that
the courts are now deeply implicated in politics. These stories
make the material of the legal system accessible in a way that
would be useful in teaching.
Other stories are dramatic episodes from within individual legal
systems. For example, Doris Marie Provine in her chapter on
France provides an extended discussion of the distribution in
France of HIV contaminated blood. Those infected took a criminal
suit against the government. Provine tells the story and
discusses it as exemplifying the use of law in enacting a moral
drama (pp. 220-230). The story is compelling and tragic. It would
also be a useful way to begin to discuss different cross-national
frameworks for government regulation, for example. The lack of a
common explanatory framework across chapters makes it difficult
to know what to make of stories such as this one, distinctive to
a particular legal system, in a comparative context. Surely it
illustrates that important public dramas are addressed in France
as they are in other national states, perhaps despite a
once-dominant sense that courts were only important in American
public life. But how and why is it interestingly different from
or similar to the place of public dramas in law in other national
states? While the collection includes a concluding chapter by
Jacob drawing some themes together, the question of the basis of
comparison is a difficult one to answer.
Similarly, Joseph Sanders addresses the question of liability for
disastrous mercury poisoning in Japan in Minamata that left many
people badly injured (pp. 349-358). The story is significant in
itself and tells us the complexity of environmental regulation
and personal injury liability.. Because the stories are so rich,
they would make excellent teaching tools. Indeed, many important
points about the legal systems in the different state/societies
are illustrated by stories, not often enough illuminated by
reference to common explanatory or interpretive frameworks.
Sanders's discussion of legal consciousness in the context of
liability is one illustration of the advantages of making
comparisons more explicit. In discussing liability for automobile
accidents Sanders does draw comparisons with how other Western
industrialized states have handled liability, and uses the work
to raise questions about the standard Western story that the
Japanese emphasize social harmony over rights (pp. 354-358).
The stories, even if not constructed with parallel aims, are part
of what could make the book a useful teaching tool. A difficulty
rests not in the different use of stories but the different use
of concepts. Erhard Blankenburg's chapter embodies this problem
most substantially. Blankenburg chooses to define "legal
culture" at the beginning of his chapter. He defines it in a
way more all encompassing than what most who would study culture
would choose and indeed explicitly chooses to distinguish his
conception from those usually used in law and society work.
Instead of understanding culture as concerning common frameworks
of meaning and/or practice, Blankenburg includes the body of law,
legal institutions, patterns of litigation, and beliefs about law
(at p. 256). With such an all-encompassing understanding of
culture, it is difficult to see what work the concept of culture
does. More than that, introducing general concepts that are not
used across chapters detracts from the purpose of providing
information for students. Joseph Sanders uses the concept of
legal consciousness (pp. 358-65), which Blankenburg alludes to in
his outline of legal culture (pp. 255-256). Jacob's American
chapter mentions rights consciousness (pp.50-51). All are
important and related concepts. The lack of uniformity provides
no difficulty for the book's stated purpose of pointing out the
need for further research; scholars make choices about conceptual
frameworks all the time. It does, however, make building
systematic comparisons for students somewhat difficult.
Since the book urges further research, I would like to outline a
direction that I believe is fruitful. First, it is difficult to
tell why we choose to make law a focus for analysis in itself.
What issues are legal is not only a nationally and culturally
variable question. It is not only nationally and culturally
variable; it is also a matter of happenstance. So the question of
HIV contaminated blood became a major legal/political issue in
France, involving the government and questions about its
integrity. It is not one in the United States, although there
have been large numbers of liability cases. If we were to use the
story to build comparison, we would need to think about several
questions. What is it that is being compared? Public dramas that
involve law? State organization and involvement in medicine? What
is the basis of comparison? Without seriously thinking through
these questions it is difficult either to explain differences and
similarities between legal systems or to interpret the meanings
of issues within legal cultures. One useful tack is to take a
field of interest--whether divorce, equal employment opportunity,
or personal injury liability--and see how that field of questions
is addressed in different legal/political systems, with courts
and lawyers as one set of players, though not the only one. Such
questions would clearly be constructed within the framework of a
particular governing system and might well take us beyond the
strict confines of the legal system itself. Divorce, for example,
is not handled by what in the United States we would recognize as
legal officials. But to take a substantive issue such as divorce
allows us to examine why issues are legal in one context and not
in another, or how courts participate in making a field of
politics and policy in different areas. Sally Kenney's work on
fetal protection in Britain and the United States is exemplary.
Defining a study by field of interest rather than the institution
itself would help to avoid the problem of simply noting the
accidents of what gets to be a legal issue in different
state/societies. Second, more synthetic comparative work on legal
systems would be useful if they used analytical frameworks
explicitly a part of other social science work, so that scholars
cannot treat the study of law as something wholly apart. This
collection makes visible the value of pursuing comparative work
on law and integrating it into the study of other institutions.
Copyright 1996