Vol. 11 No. 1 (January 2001) pp. 48-50.

YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE by Thomas Grisso and Robert G. Schwartz (Editors). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 462 pp. Cloth $35.00. ISBN: 0-226-30912-6.

Reviewed by Odeana R. Neal. University of Baltimore, School of Law.

YOUTH ON TRIAL should be required reading for every person who has involvement or interest in the juvenile justice system. There is something of interest in it for attorneys, probation officers, intake workers, psychologists, social workers, legislators, policy analysts, criminologists, and other social scientists. The editors, Thomas Grisso, a psychologist in the department of psychiatry at the University of Massachusetts Medical School, and Robert Schwartz, the executive director of the Juvenile Law Center in Philadelphia, have brought together authors from a number of disciplines to examine juvenile court processes and the degree to which they do not comport with what we know about child development.

The book is divided into three parts. The first, A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice, is also the subtitle of the book. This section sets out briefly the contours of the juvenile justice system as it exists in most states and sets out the landscape of psychological disorders and psychological development that will be relevant for the rest of the volume. This brief introductory section of the book makes it clear that the discussion about child development will be a scientific discussion and not one based on the intuition, hunches, or "common knowledge" about children or the nature of childhood that has informed much of juvenile justice policy.

The next two parts of the book are titled Adolescents' Capacities as Trial Defendants, and Culpability and Youths' Capacities. The authors of each of the articles approaches the subject matter from a different perspective, yet the message of each of them is clear: our juvenile justice system, even at its best, does not adequately take into account the differences between adults and children as measured by the psychological differences between the two. This is particularly true when the child is a "youth" or "adolescent" straddling the fence between childhood and adulthood. The authors all seem to be combating the popular notion of "adult time for adult crime." Instead, they argue, the psychological development of children affects their ability to fully understand their constitutional rights, limits their ability to participate meaningfully in their trials, and, finally, reduces their moral culpability for the commission of even very bad acts.

When the Supreme Court decided IN RE GAULT (1967), it did so with the motivation of creating a fairer juvenile system for delinquents. By deciding that children had the right to an attorney and to remain silent, among other rights, the Court afforded many procedural protections granted to adults. The irony is, however, that the effect of granting these rights also created an expectation that children would be able to invoke them, which, as this book points out, is virtually impossible for most

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children. Since most children do not fully understand all the rights enumerated in a Miranda warning, for example, they cannot be said to waive their right to remain silent knowingly and intelligently. Since most children do not fully understand the nature of a trial and the role of the various participants, there is a question whether so many should be considered competent to stand trial, especially if that trial will be held in an adult criminal court. Since most children undervalue long-term consequences and overvalue short- term consequences, they may be incapable of consulting with their attorney or directing the course of litigation in a manner that is in their best interest. Finally, since most children's immaturity and developmental perspective affects the way in which they choose to and participate in criminal acts, they cannot be said to be culpable in the way that adults are.

Most of these premises are not new. Indeed, it was recognition of the fact that adults are children are different which led to the creation of the juvenile justice system in the first place. (Interestingly, the first juvenile justice system and many created afterwards recognized sixteen as the age at which children become fully criminally culpable as adults. The science in YOUTH ON TRIAL indicates that, developmentally, this is for many children the age at which most children are become cognitive, though not perhaps emotional, adults.) This book is full of adept and persuasive analysis of the ways in which the juvenile justice system does not adequately take into account the cognitive, emotional, and psychological development of children. Though the quantity and quality of this type of data has not been collected before, and certainly not in a way that is so readable and engaging, whether this information and even its wide dissemination will have a significant impact on the way that the juvenile justice system is conducted is highly questionable.

A compelling chapter on what this psychological understanding means for the representation of children, serves as an example. Thomas Grisso states that children are better able to participate in the lawyer-client relationship and in the trial process when they have had a close and on-going relationship with their attorneys. However for most children in the juvenile justice system who are lucky enough to have attorneys, that relationship is often brief and hurried. Publicly-paid juvenile defenders have tremendous caseloads that prevent their active engagement with their clients on a regular basis. Many will not even meet their clients before the first court appearance and their opportunities to meet with their clients for any prolonged period prior to trial. It is no revelation that creating a relationship of trust with the client takes time and that trusting relationship will allow the attorney to better counsel and advise her client, but there are few states, if any, which are eager to increase their funding for public lawyers so that their clients can have better representation, even if those clients are children. Providing legislatures with information about how those who represent children have an even greater task than other attorneys is unlikely to adjust state budgets accordingly.

The strength of this book is in its interdisciplinary approach. I read the book as both an academic and a former practicing attorney and the book included sections that appealed to both those parts of my professional persona. I read the psychology portions of the book without being a social scientist, but I have no doubt that those trained in the social sciences will find the book as rewarding as I did. There is hard science here, along with recommendations

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concerning where further research is needed. Most pronounced seems to be the need for study into the degree to which the developmental psychology of delinquent children may differ from that of non-delinquent children, thereby creating an even greater need to restructure juvenile processes.

Despite the hopes of the child savers who created the first juvenile justice systems in the country, the truth is, as Berry Feld writes in his article, that the primary purpose of the juvenile justice system is social control. Indeed, that was in many respects the primary goal of those first child savers. Just as has occurred in the criminal justice system, the juvenile justice system is culturally and jurisprudentially less and less concerned about ensuring fundamental fairness given the individual characteristics of the accused than it is in ensuring that appropriate punishment be meted out to a person who has committed an offense. Providing more information about those accused, therefore, will, without more, have little effect on our processes of justice.

REFERENCE:

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).