Vol. 4 No. 4 (April, 1994) pp. 58-60
THE REHNQUIST COURT: IN PURSUIT OF JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM by
Stanley H. Friedelbaum. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1994. 184 pp. Cloth $49.95.
Reviewed by Thomas R. Hensley, Department of Political Science,
Kent State University.
Stanley H. Friedelbaum's THE REHNQUIST COURT: IN PURSUIT OF
JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM is the latest in a series of books (e.g.,
Savage, 1992; Decker, 1992; and Domino, 1994) examining whether
the Supreme Court has engaged in a conservative counterrevolution
since William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986. This is a
central issue to students of the Supreme Court because of the
dramatic changes in the Court's membership that occurred during
the conservative Republican presidencies of Ronald Reagan and
George Bush. Examining the Court's decisions through the
1991-1992 term, Friedelbaum provides a mixed answer to this
question. He argues that a coalition of six or seven conservative
members frequently dominate the Court's decision making, and in
some areas this majority has produced dramatic, new conservative
precedents. Friedelbaum also argues, however, that a more
centrist coalition composed of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter appears to have emerged to control the decisions in some
important areas. Friedelbaum's brief but valuable book focuses
upon the Court's civil rights and liberties decisions, although
he devotes an initial chapter to federalism, a theme to which he
returns throughout the book. In each chapter, he begins with a
brief introduction and historic overview of the topic, and then
he presents a more detailed description and analysis of the major
decisions of the Rehnquist Court, concluding each chapter with an
assessment of the extent to which the Court has become more
conservative in its policies.
The strongest chapter in the book is the first chapter on
federalism, an area in which Friedelbaum has written extensively.
He provides a detailed analysis of the Burger Court's major cases
on federalism, focusing upon the Court's decisions of NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY (1976), in which a majority of the
justices gave substantial emphasis to states' rights, and GARCIA
V. SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY (1985), in which
the Court overturned NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES and embraced a
predominant role for the federal government over the states.
Friedelbaum then examines major Rehnquist Court cases dealing
with federalism, arguing that no significant alterations of
GARCIA have occurred. He does see the possibility of the Court
eventually embracing a more balanced position between NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES and GARCIA, but this development, like many
others, may be determined by future personnel changes on the
Court. The Court's treatment of liberty and privacy interests is
the subject of Chapter Two. Friedelbaum gives primary attention
to the abortion controversy, but he also focuses upon the topics
of homosexuality, child abuse, paternity rights, and the
right-to-die. In examining the subject of abortion, he presents
interesting discussions of the Rehnquist Court's decisions in
WEBSTER V. REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES (1989) and RUST V.
SULLIVAN (1991), but the analysis of PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY (1992) is disappointing. He
gives only one paragraph to this important case, concluding that
"a newly formed coalition, consisting of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, reaffirmed the essential holding of ROE V.
WADE (p. 34). He makes no mention of the development of the
"undue burden" standard and the repudiation of the
trimester formula by this trio, nor does he discuss the deep and
continuing fragmentation within the Court over the abortion
issue. Given his emphasis in the concluding chapter on the
importance of this case, it is surprising that so little
attention was given to it in Chapter Two. In his conclusion to
the chapter, Friedelbaum argues that the Court has been generally
conservative in its decision making in this area, but he suggests
that the Court is not likely to be able to resist societal
pressures for greater liberty and privacy interests.
Freedom of speech issues are discussed in Chapter Three, with
separate discussions given to the topics of speech by public
employees, speech in
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public and non-public forums, symbolic speech and expressive
conduct, and commercial speech. Brief consideration is also given
in this chapter to freedom of association. Although Friedelbaum
discusses many significant freedom of speech cases of the
Rehnquist Court, he completely omits the important 1992 case of
R.A.V. V. ST PAUL dealing with hate speech. Friedelbaum concludes
the chapter by arguing, "On balance, the current state of
expressive freedoms in the Rehnquist Court, though clearly not at
the apex of libertarian activism, does not suggest any marked
dilution of constitutional values" (p. 68). His analysis
throughout the chapter provides convincing support for this
assessment, although he recognizes that the Rehnquist Court does
not seem as committed to commercial speech as was the Burger
Court.
Chapter Four deals with various aspects of freedom of the press,
with primary emphasis on the topics of libel, obscenity, the free
press/fair trial controversy, and freedom of the press in the
public schools. Friedelbaum sees a somewhat mixed pattern in this
area, but he argues that "tenets of press freedom remain
secure..." (p. 89). He believes that in the area of libel
the Court has struck a workable balance between press freedom and
the privacy rights of individuals. In regard to the difficult
subject of obscenity, he argues that the Court has moved away
from definitional approaches and is relying instead on states'
traditional police powers to deal with the secondary effects
related to issues of obscenity. Friedelbaum argues that the Court
has emphasized the right of fair trial over freedom of the press,
and he concludes that press freedom in the public schools is
truncated at best.
Friedelbaum examines the Rehnquist Court's treatment of the
religion clauses in Chapter Five, placing substantial emphasis on
the tensions between the two clauses. Primary attention is given
in the chapter to the Establishment Clause, and Friedelbaum's
analysis is thorough and insightful. He emphasizes the lack of
consistency in the Court's historic treatment of Establishment
Clause issues, and he discusses the controversies within the
Court over the approaches of strict separation, neutrality, and
accommodation as well as the ongoing conflict over the utility of
the three-part LEMON test. Strangely, however, Friedelbaum makes
no mention of the important 1992 case of LEE V. WEISMAN, the case
in which the Court surprised many observers by finding public
school graduation prayers to be unconstitutional. Although the
omission of this case does not undercut the validity of his
generalizations about the Rehnquist Court's treatment of the
Establishment Clause, a consideration of this case could have
strengthened the entire book. LEE V. WEISMAN revealed the
continuing controversy among the justices regarding the
interpretation of the Establishment Clause, for Kennedy
surprisingly bolted from the accommodationist camp in this case.
Furthermore, Friedelbaum states that Souter's "views remain
largely unknown with respect to the Establishment Clause..."
(p. 100), but Souter provided a detailed statement of his
neutralist Establishment Clause orientation in this case.
Finally, this case provides support to Friedelbaum's thesis
regarding the emergence of a centrist coalition of Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter, yet it is only mentioned in a footnote in
the final chapter. Friedelbaum's analysis of the Free Exercise
Clause is rather brief, but he appropriately emphasizes the
important case of OREGON V. SMITH (1990) in which the Court
undercut the precedent case of SHERBERT V. VERNER (1963), where
the Court set forth a strict scrutiny standard for judging free
exercise cases. Friedelbaum concludes his discussion of the Free
Exercise Clause by stating, "The status of free exercise as
a preferred First Amendment freedom is not clear, and its future
is increasingly dubious and precarious" (p. 109). Equal
protection is the subject of Chapter Six, with the focus on
educational desegregation, affirmative action, gender
discrimination, and age discrimination. This is the shortest
chapter in the book (13 pages), and it suffers somewhat from the
cursory treatment given to these important and complex topics. In
examining race discrimination in education, Friedelbaum focuses
on the Rehnquist Court's two conservative decisions in BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF OKLAHOMA
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CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS V. DOWELL (1991) and FREEMAN V. PITTS (1992).
Although these are certainly important cases, the Court's
remarkable decision in MISSOURI V. JENKINS (1990) allowing a
federal judge to order a school board to raise taxes to fund
magnet schools was passed over in a brief sentence. In addition,
the liberal decision in UNITED STATES V. FORDICE (1992), which
dealt with the continuing racial segregation in Mississippi's
colleges, was discussed at the end of the chapter rather than
under the heading of educational desegregation. A more balanced
assessment would have occurred if all of these cases had been
given fuller consideration in the same section of the chapter. In
discussing affirmative action, Friedelbaum places primary
emphasis on CITY OF RICHMOND V. J. A. CROSON (1989) in which a
Court majority for the first time placed affirmative action cases
under suspect classification, and he concludes that "a
return to strict scrutiny as the criterion of validity augurs a
period of moderation, if not of cessation, in the development of
programs explicitly designed to assist minorities" (p. 119).
METRO BROADCASTING V. FCC (1990) resulted in a majority of the
court applying an intermediate standard of scrutiny for federal
affirmative action cases, however, and Friedelbaum only mentions
this casually in a footnote. Shifting to an examination of gender
and age discrimination, Friedelbaum argues that the Rehnquist
Court has refused to extend protections beyond those established
by the Burger Court, and he sees no likelihood that this will
occur in the near future.
Although Friedelbaum devotes only one rather brief chapter to the
subject of the guarantees of the criminally accused, he covers an
enormous amount of ground in an effective manner. His focus is
upon involuntary confessions, habeas corpus, probable cause and
warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment, and the Eighth
Amendment death penalty cases with special attention given to
PAYNE V. TENNESSEE (1991), in which a majority of the Court
indicated a willingness to engage in a wholesale assault on
Warren and Burger Court precedents. Friedelbaum argues that the
Rehnquist Court has been notably conservative in this area of the
law: "The Rehnquist Court, it seems, has embarked upon a
studied, intentional course less attentive to broadening or
substantially preserving constitutional safeguards long
associated with the process of the criminal law" (p. 133).
He does have doubts, however, that a majority exists to engage in
the frontal assault on precedent suggested in PAYNE. Friedelbaum
has written an insightful, readable analysis of the first seven
terms of the Rehnquist Court. He provides strong support for his
central thesis that the Rehnquist Court has not been as
conservative as it initially appeared to be when Kennedy replaced
Powell and as many predicted it would become when Souter replaced
Brennan and Thomas replaced Marshall. His argument is somewhat
less convincing that a more moderate coalition of Kennedy,
O'Connor, and Souter has emerged as a major force on the Court,
for Friedelbaum's primary evidence of this involves the 1992
CASEY abortion decision. This is an important possibility,
however, and deserves close and continuing analysis by students
of the Court. Thus, despite some relatively minor criticisms
which can be raised, the book is recommended reading for anyone
interested in the decisional patterns of the Rehnquist Court. It
is a brief but rich doctrinal examination of many of the Rehn-
quist Court's major decisions, and it is also a good source of
hypotheses for more empirically oriented studies of the Court.
REFERENCES
Decker, John F. 1992. REVOLUTION TO THE RIGHT: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA. New York:
Garland Publishing.
Domino, John C. 1994. CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES: TOWARD THE 21ST
CENTURY. New York: HarperCollins.
Savage, David G. 1992. TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST
COURT. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Copyright 1994