Vol. 5 No. 11 (November, 1995) pp. 267-269
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS by William A.
Fischel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 415 pp. Cloth
$45.00
Reviewed by Marc Allen Eisner, Department of Government, Wesleyan
University.
REGULATORY TAKINGS by William Fischel is the most recent
contribution to a growing body of literature on the takings
issue. In this rich volume, Fischel critically assesses the
central debates on the regulatory infringement of property
rights, the adjudication of disputes surrounding regulatory
takings, and the weighing of key values that should be addressed
in the process. In Fischel's words: "The overriding theme is
that the comparative advantage of constitutional courts in
protecting property rights is to intervene when the economic
protections of 'exit' and the political protections of 'voice'
are attenuated. The issue of fairness and efficiency that
underlie the takings issue should otherwise be left to the
political branches of the state and federal government" (p.
5). In arriving at this conclusion, Fischel takes the reader
through a fascinating set of arguments and debates.
As one might expect, Fischel begins the book with a discussion of
PENNSYLVANIA COAL V. MAHON, the 1922 decision that framed the
takings debate. The dispute before the court addressed a
Pennsylvania state law (the Kohler Act) which prohibited mining
in built-up areas because the extraction of anthracite coal could
result in subsidence. The problem with what appeared to be a
reasonable law was that surface property owners had acquired
their land having been given explicit warning that the mining
concern would not assume liability for damage to surface
structures. Presumably, the information that the coal company was
not liable and the resulting risk were reflected in land prices.
In passing the Kohler Act, the Pennsylvania legislature was
transferring property from one party (the coal companies) to
another (the land owners) without compensation. The Supreme Court
found on behalf of Pennsylvania Coal. The majority decision,
written by Justice Holmes, concluded: "So far as private
persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk of
acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that
their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them of
greater rights than they bought." Stated another way,
"it is not plain that a man's misfortunes or necessities
will justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor's
shoulders. We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change" (p. 21).
Fischel's examination of PENNSYLVANIA COAL draws on an
exploration of the historical record as developed through
archival research and interviews. This analysis, when taken by
itself, more than justifies the publication of the volume.
Fischel's investigation reveals much of interest. The two most
interesting findings are as follows: First, the Pennsylvania
legislature passed the Kohler Act along with the Fowler Act --
the two must be understood in tandem. Under the Kohler Act,
mining in developed areas was prohibited due to the possibility
of subsidence. Individuals could get a court injunction to stop
mining beneath developed areas. However, the Fowler Act imposed
an "optional" tax on anthracite which would be used to
repair damages caused by subsidence. If mining companies paid the
Fowler tax on their operations statewide, they would receive an
exemption from the Kohler Act. Thus, the act that was central to
the dispute in PENNSYLVANIA COAL was more a means of extracting
revenues than it was a means of protecting the property of land
owners. Second, despite the rhetoric surrounding the decision,
PENNSYLVANIA COAL had a policy of repairing structures damaged by
its mining operations. Why would the company assume liability
even when they it was explicitly exempted under the provisions of
the land contracts? Fischel argues that the answer can be found
in the need to maintain a positive public image and the
integration of company employees, town people, and corporate
executives.
The conflicts in PENNSYLVANIA COAL are similar to those that
exists in many policy arenas today. Zoning disputes, land-use
policy, and a host of additional regulatory policies involve the
transfer of property rights without proper compensation --
supposedly in pursuit of the public interest. The remainder of
REGULATORY TAKINGS addresses the issues of how best to resolve
the disputes inherent in these situations and where the authority
over critical decisions concerning the transfer of property
rights should be located. Fischel's examination in chapters 3-5
is comprehensive, viewing the takings issue via the analytical
frameworks offered by the Madisonian critique of majoritarianism,
John Hart Ely's political process theory, Frank Michelman's work
on just compensation, Richard Epstein's reflections in TAKINGS,
and the economic arguments associated with the rational choice
perspective. Fischel's examination is a critical one, clearly
revealing his disagreement with some of the competing approaches
to the takings issue. Thus, he is troubled by Epstein's
preference for the judiciary over majoritarian institutions. The
courts commonly make decisions without sufficient information and
one may always be vulnerable to shifts in judicial basis.
"What is to prevent a future court, influenced by a Rawlsian
rather than a Nozickian view of the good society, from insisting
that Congress must raise income taxes to their Eisenhower-era
levels?" (p. 182) Similarly, Fischel understands the
limitations of his own economics discipline in addressing the
takings due to its incapacity to address issues of fairness:
"the issue involves fairness as well as efficiency.
Economists are uncomfortable with fairness issues and the concept
of demoralization costs, because they seem so mushy we have no
metric for them." (p. 217).
Fischel's concerns are not merely technical. Rather, they reflect
a faith in democratic processes and institutions that run
throughout REGULATORY TAKINGS. Thus, while the economics of
takings are important, "a self governing people has to
decide about takings and related wealth-distribution issues
through the institutions that it creates." (p. 217). Fischel
examines the empirical case in Chapters 6-8, considering the
record of land use policy in California and the role of local
government. Fischel recognizes the communitarian benefits of
local government but also the potential dangers when a majority
of residents outvote the owners of undeveloped lands to claim
some of their property rights. "If there is to be any limit
on regulation under the Takings Clause, some limit on the scope
of the desirable communitarian values embodied in local
government regulations must be established." (p. 288) In
Chapter 8, Fischel argues that legislatures at the state and
national level provide a better venue for addressing takings
issues than does local government due, in part, to the
opportunities for coalition building. Where exit or voice are not
options at the local level, Fischel finds judicial intervention
to be justified. This is, however, a very limited role for the
courts. Where courts have to intervene in these matters, Fischel
argues in the concluding chapter, they should appeal to a
standard of normal behavior which would determine the
acceptability of a proposed use of property on the basis of
historical practice. Compensation would be due largely in those
cases in which a decision was made to depart from historical
patterns.
REGULATORY TAKINGS is a fine contribution to the literature. It
is logically arranged, coherently argued, and written with flair
and humor. It is limited only in its focus. Despite its title, it
is restricted largely to land use policies. One wishes that
Fischel would have departed from his area of substantive
expertise to consider the application of the debates to a more
diverse set of regulatory policy issues (Compare this volume with
Richard Epstein, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE on this score).
Despite this limitation, Fischel's book likely to assume a place
next to other classics in the field and shape future discussions
of the takings issue. This volume should be widely read by
scholars of public law, law and economics, regulation, and public
policy.
References:
Epstein, Richard A. 1985. TAKINGS. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
____________. 1993. BARGAINING WITH THE STATE. 1993. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
PENNSYLVANIA COAL CO. VS. MAHON (1922). 260 U.S. 393 P>
Copyright 1995