COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION by Keith L. Dougherty. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 211pp. Cloth $49.95. ISBN: 0-521-78209-0.
Reviewed by Barry Pyle, Department of Political Science, Eastern Michigan University
Keith L. Dougherty's COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION is a wonderful account of why states complied with congressional requisitions during the Revolutionary War and under the Articles of Confederation. This book is an excellent example of the useful application of social choice theory to provide insights into the historical events and the realities of cooperation in a governmental system devoid of institutional structures designed to engender compliance.
The book is organized into four sections that include: (1) historical and philosophical background; (2) the application of social choice theory; (3) the presentation of empirical evidence in support of the theory and; (4) an analysis of need for constitutional reform brought on by a lack of collective action as well as lessons other confederations (e.g., the United Nations and the European Union) may draw from the American experience.
Dougherty dedicates the first two chapters of his book to a historical analysis of state contributions to the national government and the philosophical origins of the Articles of Confederation. In these chapters, Dougherty demonstrates a considerable knowledge of the events and ideas that gave rise to mixed state compliance with national requests. He adeptly supports his narrative with numerous citations to original and secondary sources. These chapters also serve to introduce the reader to the social choice theory he utilizes in chapter 3. As a result, readers who are unacquainted with social choice theory are eased gently into an understanding of the various types of behavior the theory expects.
Dougherty concludes that the "League of Friendship" was founded on the conflicting goals of defending state sovereignty and promoting the common good of the collective. As a result, the only incentive for state cooperation was the eighteenth century notion of a republic being bound together by civic virtue in which states were expected to set aside their own self-interests for the good of the whole. Couched in these terms, Dougherty creates a classic collective action problem where all the states desire public goods but they are unwilling to pay for them (see p. 33)
Dougherty uses chapter 3 to develop theoretic expectations of state behavior. This chapter is clearly written, and he cautiously leads the reader through his thought process with minimal reliance on jargon and an emphasis on explanation, examples and elaboration. In fact, Dougherty artfully places many of the more complicated equations and graphical representations in an Appendix where the information is accessible but it does not frustrate individuals unaccustomed to game theory. Dougherty uses Mancur Olsen's notion of the collective action problem and the provision of pure public or nonexcludable goods (i.e., a benefit that could not be denied to one state and still be provided to another). He concludes that this notion does not fit state behavior because all states would prefer to free ride on their contributions. Dougherty shows this by demonstrating that the historical data indicates that some states did contribute and at times contributed more than their quota while other states chose to "free ride". This leads Dougherty to posit that states did not view all congressional actions as purely public goods because at times states received private benefits as a byproduct of cooperation with national goals. According to Dougherty, the result is a joint product that produces both public and private goods. Therefore, the incentive for states who received the private benefit to contribute to the common cause. In the end, the notion of joint products serves as the basis for his analysis. Dougherty even invokes James Madison's words in support of his theoretical expectation: "Some parts of the United States are more exposed than others. Will the least exposed states exert themselves equally? We know that the most exposed will be more immediately interested, and will make less sacrifices in making exertions" (quoted at p. 46).
Chapter 4 the book takes what may be considered as an unnecessary detour and discusses various attempts by contemporaries to make the existing system work. This chapter may have been placed more appropriately before chapter 3. Yet, the point is clear: Congress attempted to make the system work and met little success.
Chapters 5 and 6 represent the use of multiple methodologies to amass evidence that supports Dougherty's notion of joint products and state cooperation. Chapter 5 includes the creative use of regression analysis. Consistent with the notion of private benefits, Dougherty discovers that states did not react to the elevation of the threat against the nation but they tended to contribute when the threat was more localized and the state would receive a private benefit (i.e., the protection of the state). Similarly, he finds that states who held more war debt tended to contribute more if the state's citizens held more debt or if the state's contributions when directly to its own citizens. Dougherty also uses the technique of case analysis in chapter 6 and finds that state reaction to Shay's Rebellion was closely tied to either a state's immediate need for a private benefit or the promise of future private benefits that could be culled from the existence of a standing federal force.
Chapters 5 and 6 are among the strongest in the book and they are prime examples of what makes this book special. This is not a book that views the development or application of social choice and game theory as an end in and of itself. Instead, Dougherty tests his theory with empirical evidence drawn from original sources. The evidence is considerable and it is difficult to argue with his conclusions. The strength of the theory and the weight of his evidence also allow Dougherty to draw meaningful conclusions about the role the Constitution played in fulfilling the need for institutional structures that did not rely on the civic and republican virtue or the willingness of a state to set aside its own self-interest (see Chapters 7 and 8). They also allow him to speak with authority when he applies the lessons of the American experience to other countries or organizations that rely on a voluntary confederation for collective action and the provision of public goods that do not provide private benefits.
In my view, the book's only weakness is that Dougherty seems to view the notion of joint products and the collective action problem as the single explanation of state behavior during this period. Unfortunately, there is very little discussion of alternative explanations like poor economic conditions or the capacity to collect taxes as well as the ability to provide troops. This leaves the reader wondering whether factors similar to these contributed to state behavior and how they may have affected a state's ability or willingness to contribute based on feelings of civic virtue. In my view, addressing these issues upfront would likely strengthen the book and add to its considerable credibility.
Dougherty's book is an excellent work of social science with a clearly stated theory and the skillful use of empirical evidence to support his expectations. The organization of the book and the style with which it is written make this a useful book for upper-level undergraduates and a valuable template for graduate students and scholars who wish to pursue this type of work. I might also note that Dougherty's book also represents an interesting opportunity for an extended exploration into the development of American federalism that studies the tension between state self-interest, national interest and the development of legal and political institutions designed to affect the balance between the two. In addition, Dougherty's work provides an opportunity for comparative scholarship to determine if any confederations can provide purely public goods without the influence of institutions or private benefits. This is an important book with numerous applications and considerable insight into the behavior of states, or nations, in a cooperative arrangement that go far beyond the American experience.
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Copyright 2001 by the author, Barry Pyle.