PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION--SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH
LAND USE REGULATION by Dennis J. Coyle. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, Albany, 1993. 382 pp.
Reviewed by Lee Epstein, Department of Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis
In the introduction to his book, Dennis Coyle quotes the legal
scholar Martin Shapiro: "[A]lmost all the scholarly
treatments of the modern Supreme Court have been produced either
by active proponents of and participants in the New Deal or by
its intellectual and political allies successors" (p. 12).
Surely, Coyle is an exception to Shapiro's rule: he decries New
Deal jurisprudence not just for moving property rights to the
back burner but for taking them off the stove completely.
Coyle pulls no punches. His is a book about property rights from
the perspective of the property owner. As he puts it: "I
think abdication by the courts has exposed property owners and
users to flagrant abuses of their fundamental rights" (p.
13). His views, quite interestingly, seem to emanate from a
strongly-etched childhood memory. Coyle grew up on a dairy farm
and one day, as he tells it, a state inspector came around. The
inspector had two complaints. One was that the door to the
milkhouse opened inward, when the inspector thought it should
swing out to prevent flies from entering the building. The
inspector was not concerned with the actual number of flies in
the building or with the "general level of sanitation in the
barn. The door had to open in the prescribed manner, and that was
that." The inspector also told the family that it must
replace the electric cooler with a "shiny new storage
tank," which -- at considerable expense to the family --
would pipe milk directly into its truck. Coyle's own words best
summarize the end of the story: "My father considered the
demands of the state and the bleak outlook for small farmers, and
decided it was time to embark on a new career. So the cows were
sold, and our small contribution ceased to flow into the great
stream of commerce. And to this day the milkhouse door still
swings inward" (p.5).
In important ways, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION is an ode
to that childhood memory. It searches for "the elusive
rights of landowners" (p. 9) in records of state supreme
courts and in those of the U.S. Supreme Court. And it finds some
in both, enough to allow the author to make clear-cut
recommendations about the direction into which the law should
head.
But before I get to those, let me back up and tell readers
something about Coyle's approach to property rights. From a
theoretical perspective, he suggests that arguments (legal and
otherwise) for and against the regulation of land use can be
grouped on the basis of three beliefs or "cultures":
hierarchy (or order), which asserts that well-ordered communities
are desirable and promotable through controls on land use;
liberty, which claims that such regulations often violate
fundamental, individual freedoms; and equality, which suggests
that controls on land use ought be used "to redistribute
resources and power in societys" (p.20).
The balance of the book explores how recent constitutional
litigation has sought to reconcile or, at least deal with, the
obvious conflicts among these beliefs. Chapter 4 considers the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court (with some attention to New Jersey);
Chapter 5 takes up California; and Chapter 6 explores U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine. Coyle's selection of the U.S. Supreme
Court is obvious to most readers of this publication: after years
of silence on the issue of property rights, the Court has handed
down several decisions of some interest. But it is the years of
silence that make examination of state supreme courts so
important: they left the state courts to their own devices, to
deal with the subject in a reasonably autonomous fashion. So too,
Coyle's selection of Pennsylvania and California is not
haphazard. He polled eight experts in land use law, asking them
to name the states that were most and least protective of
property rights. As he tells it, California -- not
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surprisingly -- was "a near unanimous choice" (p. 11)
in the least protective category. Pennsylvania and Illinois
emerged as those with reputations for protecting property rights.
But when Coyle examined Illinois court cases of the 1980s, he
found its reputation overly exaggerated: in only about a third of
their constitutional cases did the justices rule in favor of the
landowner. Hence his choice of Pennsylvania, which supported the
property owner in about half the cases and, along the way,
developed some innovative doctrines.
Coyle's analytic approach is similar across the three substantive
chapters. Mostly, it consists of thick doctrinal treatments of
the key legal developments. Case facts are presented in some
detail with the resulting court opinions extensively discussed.
He also explores how jurists responded to the three basic beliefs
(or cultures) about land use regulation. Interspersed within
these discussions are data from the various courts. The chapter
on the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, includes tables denoting
the votes in key landowner cases, support scores broken down by
issue areas, and justice-by-justice tallies. Chapters on the
various state supreme courts hold similar information.
What do we learn from Coyle's presentation? Some of what we take
away is quite court-specific. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
not been particularly consistent in its approach to property
cases but Coyle applauds its efforts to at least "struggl[e]
with essential cultural conflicts [e.g., hierarchy, liberty] that
other courts ignore" and to attempt " to articulate a
rationale for finding consensus within the conflict" (p.
111). The California court is in flux. With the
"liberals" now gone, so too could be the court's
traditional hostility toward landowner rights. But such a
conclusion, Coyle argues, might be premature: it is possible that
the new justices are judicial restraintists and, accordingly,
reluctant to overturn court precedent and state laws. If that is
so, as Coyle writes, the California court may be "another
case of `the more things change, the more they stay the
same'" (p. 165). The U.S. Supreme Court chapter also points
to a Court in transition, but less in terms of membership than in
doctrine. Coyle's book apparently went to press before the Court
handed down LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL (1992). Yet
his conclusion is apt and worthy of citation: "The revival
of landowner rights by the Supreme Court has been modest and
reluctant, more a consequence of the gradual extension of
existing doctrine...than a dramatic leap in a new direction.
While the Court has not become an aggressive defender of the
constitutional rights of landowners, its occasional shows of
support send a message to the members of the planning community
and elected officials that they must indeed know the
Constitution, a message they had grown unaccustomed to hearing,
and tell the polity that property may be something worth
protecting. In the land use area, the Court is no longer just the
good solider of hierarchy" (p.209).
We also learn about how the three beliefs (or cultures) play out
in land dispute litigation. Indeed, it is quite important to
Coyle that we come away from the substantive analyses with some
sense about the various jurists' use of these cultures. For his
ultimate objectives are 1) to demonstrate that allowing unlimited
government regulation of land use does not serve well any of the
three values and 2) to suggest an approach that can satisfy them.
That approach is a mid-level standard of constitutional scrutiny
under which legislation would be required to "bear a
substantial relationship to an important governmental
objective" (p. 258). Such an approach, Coyle argues, would
satisfy egalitarians, libertarians, and hierarchists; it is also,
of course, a compromise between the current (and, to Coyle,
unacceptable) use of the rational basis standard and the
compelling interest standard used for preferred freedoms.
Whether this seems a plausible solution is something I leave to
readers to determine. And I do hope that this book gets read
because there is much to commend about it. Before Coyle entered
the academic world, he worked as a newspaper reporter and
editorial writer. His former career served him well: PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION is an
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elegantly-written work, a pleasure to read. What is more, I
learned a lot. I admit here and now that I agreed to review this
book because I wanted to bolster my knowledge of property rights
-- one of today's hot legal topics. Coyle did not disappoint.
When I finished the work I had taken enough notes to round out
several constitutional law lectures and to supplement (if not
completely revise) my writings on the subject. Finally, despite
Coyle's own bias, the book is not a piece of propaganda. It has a
perspective, to be sure; but it presents the material and the
arguments in a rather objective, no-nonsense fashion.
All of this noted, I must register a complaint with one aspect of
the work -- its aspirations to be a serious piece of political
science. Quite early on, Coyle writes: "The study of
doctrine has fallen out of favor in the social sciences, and that
is regrettable...There is little recognition that the language
and logic of legal doctrine is an important factor in the outcome
of decisions and more fundamentally in the character and tone of
society. This distrust of doctrinal studies stems from an
understandable suspicion of backseat judging under the guise of
scholarly analysis" (p. 5). First, let me write that I agree
with Coyle's sentiment. And, second, that I take it to mean that
he seeks to produce a work scholars could hold to the standards
of good science.
If that is so, the book fails on several scores. Good science, I
think, is cumulative in nature; it seeks to build on what others
have done. Yet, this book -- while citing innumerable articles
written by law professors (and, to be fair, by a handful of
political scientists) -- ignores important works within the
social science literature. From a theoretical perspective, Coyle
might have consulted research on agenda setting, since so much of
the book considers the resurgence of landowner cases. Along these
lines, Richard L. Pacelle's THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S AGENDA would have given teeth to arguments he makes only
casually. Another surprising omission is the literature on state
court decision making. Coyle could have used Melinda Gann Hall's
research (e.g., 1987, 1989) to flesh out some of the observed
variance among the courts. And it is almost bizarre to think that
Coyle does not seem to have consulted Robert Sickel's aging but
still informative article (1965) on zoning laws -- of all things!
-- in the Maryland Court of Appeals.
By the same token, the results of good science should be amenable
to replication. Coyle's work does not meet this standard because
he does not tell us how he located the cases in the study. The
reader cannot determine if his data (and narrative) are inclusive
(covering all cases decided by the various courts for the time
period under analysis) or merely illustrative. If it is the
latter, Coyle fails to provide us with his criteria for case
selection. In the absence of such information, I was left with
considerable skepticism about the results of Coyle's data
analyses.
Other problems with the book -- at least from a scientific
perspective -- are not difficult to summon; for example, the
small number of cases make his judge-by-judge voting analyses
less than credible. But I shall stop here and simply reiterate my
bottom line. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION may not live up
to some of its more scientific aspirations, but it does meet many
of its other promises. And, on balance, those far outweigh its
shortcomings. I strongly recommend the volume for your
consideration.
References
Hall, Melinda Gann. 1987. "Constituent Influence in State
Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a Case Study." JOURNAL
OF POLITICS 49:1117-24.
Hall, Melinda Gann and Paul Brace. 1989. "Order in the
Courts: A Neo-Institutional Approach to Judicial Consensus."
WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 42: 391-407.
Pacelle, Richard L., Jr. 1991. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S
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AGENDA. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.
Sickels, Robert. 1965. "The Illusion of Judicial
Consensus." AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 59: 100-104.