Vol. 3 No. 6 (June, 1993) pp. 63-66
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF
LEGAL POLICY by Cornell W. Clayton. Amonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
Inc., 1992. 274 pp. Cloth $45.00. Paper $18.00.
Reviewed by H. W. Perry, Jr., Department of Government, Harvard
University
Cornell Clayton does what many scholars fail to do. He places and
examines his subject, the attorney general, squarely are
sumptom-within the context of broader concerns of American
politics. He does this systematically, not simply with nods here
and there. His focus is on the attorney general, but his contex-
tual approach leads him to deal with the judiciary, the Congress,
the president, and the bureaucracy. The contextual approach is
the book's great strength. Students of various aspects of
American politics, including the attorney general, will not learn
a lot new about their area of expertise, but they will be chal-
lenged to think about their respective specialties in an intelli-
gent and more integrated way. That is especially true for those
of us whose focus is the law and legal institutions. How often do
we think about the effects of divided government or the
congressional reforms of the seventies as important for under-
standing law and legal policy making? Clayton forces us to do
that. Those unfamiliar with the attorney general will learn much
from reading this book.
Clayton argues that the attorney general has become a very
important political figure and that the process of making legal
policy has become highly politicized in the United States. He
suggests that, "The controversies that have surrounded
recent Attorneys General present a marked contrast to the
relative ob- scurity in which the office operated throughout most
of its existence" (p. 3). He claims that "prior to the
1930s, govern- ment legal policy making was generally viewed as a
`legal' rather than `political' enterprise" (p. 3). Though I
am always skepti- cal of claims about how "apolitical"
legal institutions were in the past, his claims are ones that
most readers will find persua- sive.
Clayton's explanation for why the attorney general has become so
important includes several factors. First, he suggests that the
attorney general has evolved "from an elite barrister,
perceived as a judicial institution, into an administrator of a
massive executive branch bureaucracy"(p. 6). Secondly, he
argues that "the acceptance of more integrative modes of
political jurisprudence and the growth of interest group
litigation have led to the judicialization of larger and larger
areas of public policy." He believes that "this in turn
has created a more politically autonomous judiciary and increased
the importance of litigation and judicial selection as
instruments of presidential policy making" (pp. 6-7). Such
arguments are not uncommon. It is his third reason that is most
intriguing and important for his larger argument.
. . . because Democrats have tended to control Congress and the
Republicans the White House, since 1968 there has been a tendency
for policy disputes to be transformed into institu- tional
conflicts over constitutional powers. . . . Polar- ization of
ideology, both within and between the two elected branches, has
had dire consequences for democratic control of public policy.
Presidents have increasingly relied on administrative strategies
of policy making, while Congress has increasingly sought to
"micro-manage" administration. The result is a new
style of administrative law: one in which the judiciary is more
intricately involved in the administrative process, and where
control over agency liti- gation becomes an important lever for
bureaucratic manage- ment. (p. 7)
It is his arguments in support of this premise that constitute
the most interesting and debatable part of his book. He extends
his systemic perspective as follows:
The transformation in the conventions and perceptions that define
the Attorney General's role as the government's chief legal
policymaker, however, are symptom-
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atic of more fundamental changes in the American political
system. The twentieth-century metamorphosis of the federal
government from a limited to a positive state greatly magni- fied
the tensions inherent in our system of separated pow- ers. This
development, coupled with the erosion of American political
parties and the regularization of split-ticket voting in the
post-1968 period, has altered fundamentally the style of American
politics. While the operations of nearly all major political
institutions changed, the central role that "the law"
plays in the constitutional system put particular stress on the
legal policy establishment. (p. 4)
While the contextual approach is the great strength of Clayton's
work, it also provides fodder for those who would disagree with
him. After all, there is much disagreement among political
scientists about American politics, so their is no clearly agreed
upon context in which to place the attorney general. For example,
Clayton argues that the effects of divided government matter for
legal policy making, but of course, there is debate among
political scientists about the effects of divided government.
Clayton varies in his acknowledgment of, and his coming to terms
with, differing interpretations about the attor- ney general and
other institutions or legal doctrine. At times he gives a
detailed argument for his understanding; other times, he tends to
take a point of view with less justification. Nevertheless,
Clayton usually gives a defensible, if not univer- sally
accepted, view of those things that he examines. He cannot be
expected to solve all the debates of American politics, nor can
he be expected to give every rival hypothesis or interpreta- tion
to explain the behavior of the attorney general. Disagree- ments
with him should be of the best sort; they will generally be with
his interpretations. And, I should add, I found many of them
persuasive.
After the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 outlines the history of
the attorney general and gives a brief description of the modern
Department of Justice. Chapter 3 traces the evolution of the
political role of the attorney general. In these chap- ters, and
others for that matter, Clayton provides us with a nice summary
of a great deal of history -- both in terms of events and
doctrine. Most details come from secondary sources, but he puts
them together in highly readable ways, and he also adds informa-
tion from some personal interviews. A quibble, Clayton is often
not clear about time frames. Modern sometimes seems to refer to
post-Hoover, other times, the Warren Court forward, and still
other times post-Carter. One issue that Clayton makes much of is
interesting, though, in my opinion, overstated. Clayton claims
that the attorney general was initially considered to be a
judicial officer and only evolved into becoming an executive one.
Though he offers additional evidence, his main proof is that the
position was created in a bill that created courts, and that an
earlier version of the bill had the attorney general appointed by
the Supreme Court. However, the fact that the original bill was
amended is quite significant, and the fact that the subsequent
legislation was vague is unimportant because it clearly left
appointment to the President. Much early legislation did not fall
along lines that separate the branches neatly. I make an issue of
this because I think it confuses the issues of "politic-
ization" that Clayton is at such pains to put in systemic
per- spective. Arguments such as Clayton's can be problematic if
used to solve modern day Constitutional questions about
separation of powers. Also the argument does not fit very well
with Clayton's exposition about the British attorney general
being the forerun- ner of the office. Clayton's main point is
certainly correct in saying that the office has evolved
dramatically from its original function, and the office has shed
much of its "above politics" character, but even when
attorneys general of the past performed "the most
law-related functions" they were nonetheless executive in
nature even if not very "political."
Clayton wrestles intelligently with the dilemma of politici-
zation. He understands the word at various levels of meaning. As
he puts it, "It is one thing to say the President should not
be allowed to obstruct criminal investigations of his own admin-
istration; it is quite another to deny
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him any influence over government legal policy. . . .The problem
is that it is next to impossible to erect legal obstacles that
prevent partisan corruption and cronyism that do not also effect
political influence of a proper kind." (p. 102) He may give
a bit too much attention to scandals, but this may be due to his
concern with documenting change, and scandals have been important
historically. Of greater concern, is that he too often accepts
the journalistic account, or the "common wisdom"
account of what was going on at the Justice Department. In his
defense, given the lack of research on the Justice Department,
there are few places to turn for more sophisticated
understandings, but it does make his analysis more suspect.
Chapter 4 begins a discussion of separation of powers. Issues
surrounding separation of powers play a prominent role throughout
the remainder of the book. He walks through the doctrinal
evolution as it relates to the President versus Con- gress and he
introduces the complicating factor of a "fourth
branch," the bureaucracy.
Chapter 5 is entitled "The New American Political System and
the Judicialization of Politics." Clayton argues that
beginning with Roosevelt -- after he ultimately won the war
subsequent to losing the battle in the court-packing scheme --
that a new alli- ance was forged between the executive and
judicial branches. Not only did attorneys general become more
partisan advocates, but the courts worked in tandem with the
President. For the Roose- velt era, it meant the courts stayed
out of the way. For Truman, Johnson and Kennedy, it meant that
Courts helped Presidents achieve their policy goals despite a
recalcitrant Congress. The example used is civil rights. Other
examples might suggest a different story. One does not usually
think of an alliance between Truman and the judiciary.
Nevertheless, Clayton's basic argument as used is sound. He goes
on to tell the story of the Warren Court revolution that made the
judiciary more political and independently powerful. The collapse
of the judicial-execut- ive alliance occurs with the Nixon
administration, brought about by Nixon's antagonism to liberal
judges and ultimately by Water- gate. Watergate displayed the
worst aspects of an overly politi- cized office and so following
the Nixon era, Ford and Carter attempted to depoliticize Justice.
Clayton then tells the story of the politicization of Justice by
Reagan. He argues that more and more people flooded Washington,
D.C. who were "true believ- ers" rather than
"plain old politicians." He suggests that "When
deeply held personal beliefs are perceived to be at stake,
flexibility is lost and policy give-and-take becomes
impossible" (p. 122).
Again, to his credit, Clayton draws upon the work of politi- cal
scientists in other areas to help explain the new American
politics and its effect on behavior at Justice. Drawing from
scholars like Benjamin Ginsberg, Martin Shefter, and others, he
argues:
National politics used to be fought out in the voting booth every
four years, with clearly identified partisan camps competing for
control of policymaking institutions. The electoral arena
produced clear winners and losers. The winners gained a chance to
implement their policy agenda centered around a set of
materialistic claims; the losers, playing the role of the loyal
opposition, waited for the next election. (p. 123).
Really? That is not my understanding, though I know it is for
some political scientists. Whatever one's understanding of the
past, Clayton's understanding of the present is important. The
following excerpt encapsulates what may be his most important
point, which is that partisan policy disputes now have a greater
chance of escalating into constitutional conflicts over the
powers of the Congress and the president, and this inevitably
politicizes Justice.
The implications of postelectoral politics for the Justice
Department are profound. The regularization of institutional
conflict, especially over the control of the administrative
bureaucracy, and the legalization of policy disputes thoroughly
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politicizes the day-to-day environment of the Justice De-
partment. The separation of powers and the unique character of
the Supreme Court power of judicial review have always left
America's legal establishment susceptible to politiciz- ation
during periods of constitutional conflict or crisis. The
difference is that constitutional conflicts used to be limited to
periods of extraordinary political development and
transformation, periods of critical realignments. In the new
American political system, they have become regular- ized and
routine, merely the pursuit of politics by any other means. (p.
123).
Clayton sees the separation of powers battleground played out
most dramatically and importantly in administrative law. That is
the subject of Chapter 6. This is a very interesting chapter. He
outlines some doctrinal developments in administra- tive law and
highlights court battles between the legislature and the
executive over control of the bureaucracy. He disagrees strongly
with the interpretations of scholars like Martin Shapiro and
Jeremy Rabkin, and in my opinion he does not always win the
debate, especially with Shapiro. But his own argument as it
relates to the role of the Justice Department in the conflict is
important. He concludes that, "because of its strategic
position between courts, the Congress, and other administrative
agencies, the Justice Department is at the center of these new
administra- tive law conflicts." Clayton's arguments tend to
assume, though they are not necessarily dependent upon, divided
government, so the Clinton Administration should be an
interesting test for the systemic nature of his argument.
The book concludes with an epilogue about the Bush adminis-
tration. He lets us see his own normative position, which is
fine, but his arguments are not systematically developed as they
are in the rest of his book. For example, he even suggests that
we might need a new constitution, which comes almost out of left
field. Readers sometimes read a concluding chapter of a book to
gauge its value. That would be unfortunate here because it is not
at all indicative of his careful arguments elsewhere.
THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE is a very fine book. It should be of
interest to many different publics. Students of legal policy
making will benefit from reading it. Students of Congress, the
bureaucracy, or other aspects of American politics should pay
greater attention to public law scholarship generally, and
Clayton's book invites and deserves such attention.