Vol. 3, No. 2 (February, 1993) pp: 13-16
NEW DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY, ADVANCES IN
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY, VOLUME 4 by Freda Adler and William S.
Laufer (editors). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
1993. 406 pp. Cloth $39.95.
Reviewed by Michael G. Maxfield, School of Public and
Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington.
This is the fourth in an occasional series of volumes, ADVANCES
IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY, launched to fill a perceived dearth of
outlets for papers focusing on theoretical issues in criminology.
As such, the series resembles more an irregular journal than a
collection of related essays. This semblance is reinforced by the
absence of an interpretive introduction by the editors; unlike
previous volumes, this one simply begins and ends. Without
guidance, one naturally turns to the table of contents for clues
about what is to follow. There are none, save the inclusion of
Travis Hirschi's name in the titles of two chapters. A reviewer
therefore faces a task roughly equivalent reviewing the complete
contents of an academic journal. The contributions themselves are
starkly uneven, but a careful reading revealed three loose themes
and three odd papers among the 11 chapters (or 12, including a
final selection labeled "comments.")
Introductions to the first and second volume note, but do not
quite lament, that academic criminology journals are increasingly
dominated by empirical research and discussions of methods. It
was felt that a forum for theory was needed. This is true, but
more so for reasons not cited by the editors. Most scholars
probably view criminology as a multidisciplinary field; others
feel it has now become a discipline. In either case some sort of
forum for bringing together discussions of theory from the
recognized disciplines that contribute to criminological research
is certainly in order. The present volume does this, after a
fashion, but more by accident than by design. On to the themes.
The first two chapters address theoretical perspectives that
could be of interest to political scientists, labeling theory and
Marxist criminology. In a chapter entitled, "The Future of
Labeling Theory," Charles Wellford and Ruth Triplett attempt
to make a case that the labeling perspective deserves more
respect. They link its essential elements to symbolic
interactionism: labels applied to individuals are symbols that
influence their behavior. Unfortunately, they focus almost
exclusively on how being labeled affects subjective perceptions
and behavior, but ignore how the behavior of public officials and
others toward labeled persons (delinquents, criminals, or just
troublemakers) is influenced by labels.
Wellford and Triplett claim that its association with conflict
criminology is one reason why labeling theory has not been more
widely embraced. As if to reinforce this, the contribution by
sociologist Austin Turk launches into a what comes off as a pep
talk for Marxist criminology, which he claims is misleadingly
referred to as conflict criminology. Whatever it is called, in
conflict/Marxist theory crime is viewed as an artifact of social
values and political power, both of which are embodied in
criminal law. Politics involves conflict over social and other
values. The winners of such conflict define certain behavior and
acts as crimes, while the losers -- people whose behavior is
rejected -- are defined as criminals. Turk serves up a few
interesting insights, but the chapter is little more than a guide
for Marxists on how they can better handle methodological
enemies.
Three chapters dwell on Travis Hirschi's (1969) influential work
on delinquency. Briefly, Hirschi proposed and tested a control
theory (also called "bonding") of delinquency. Various
sources of control can prevent delinquency. Parents, peers, and
schools are institutions that instill attachment and
internalization of social norms. Delinquency is more likely for
males with weak attachment to parents and school, and stronger
attachment to deviant peers.
Chapters by Kimberly Kempf and by Marc
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Le Blanc and Aaron Caplan complement each other nicely. Kempf's
contribution presents a meta-analysis of the numerous studies
that purport to test Hirschi's control theory. Hirschi fares well
on two of three criteria Kempf sets up for judging a theory.
First, public policy since 1969 has shifted in ways consistent
with Hirschi's emphasis on bonding and attachment. Second, the
many attempts to replicate or further test various components of
control theory indicate that it has become a subjective standard
among criminologists. Third, these subsequent empirical tests
yield mixed support. Kempf argues that differences in measurement
and other methods are responsible for inconsistent results.
Kempf's contribution itself is not especially noteworthy, but
gains added weight from the most ambitious selection in the
volume. Commenting on an earlier version of Kempf's paper, Le
Blanc and Caplan are not surprised that empirical tests produced
mixed results, because, they argue, a discursive presentation of
a complex theory invites inconsistent interpretations. The
solution offered in this chapter is to produce a formal version,
since formal theory more readily reveals internal
inconsistencies. After producing an initial formal statement of
Hirschi, Le Blanc and Caplan formulate a revised formal theory
based on: (1) internal inconsistencies revealed by the initial
formal statement, (2) results from a careful replication, and (3)
developments in control theory since Hirschi's 1969 book.
With four appendices, this chapter approaches 100 pages in
length. But it is potentially useful for two types of readers.
Scholars following in Hirschi's footsteps, and there are many,
will carefully study the formal versions, form their own
judgments and hopefully commence further studies. The intended
audience of this series -- scholars with a particular interest in
theory -- will benefit from the general discussion of formal
theory and the example presented by Le Blanc and Caplan. Many of
the second group might be dismayed by the laborious effort
required to produce formal statements. But Le Blanc and Caplan
make a convincing case that formal theory exposes sloppy thinking
(though they are careful to point out that Hirschi's theory
displays little of this), and forms the base for more systematic
empirical tests, thus avoiding the anarchy revealed by Kempf.
Michael Lynch, Graeme Newman, and W. Byron Groves present the
third contribution focusing on Hirschi's work. Two goals are
stated in this chapter; a third emerges. First, the authors
demonstrate how Durkheim's writings on punishment as a source of
social control are similar to Hirschi's development of control
theory to explain crime. Durkheim was more interested in punish-
ment as a policy, while Hirschi focused on how control and its
absence inhibited or promoted individual criminal behavior. The
second goal quickly emerges from the Durkheim-Hirschi comparison:
to demonstrate the conceptual similarities between control theory
and deterrence. Unfortunately, this exercise leads the authors to
their final goal: a specious claim that punishment cannot
possibly deter crime.
Two selections focus on corporate or white-collar crime, a topic
prominent in earlier series volumes. The chapter by Edward Sieh
is simply a discussion of case studies of employee theft in
various organizational settings in England. In essence, three
forces are at work. First, workers and work groups have varying
autonomy and opportunities for "fiddling." Second,
theft and fiddling are promoted by attempts to redress perceived
inequities in salary, working conditions, and prestige. Finally,
small-group subcultures can encourage theft, while exercising
informal controls to regulate its scope. Such observations are
interesting and worthwhile to students of employee theft, but
there are no synthetic insights of any value. For example, in a
single paragraph, Sieh suggests that other responses to inequity
may result, ranging from malingering, through union actions, to:
"... political unrest and rebellion" (p 108).
Sally Simpson's chapter on corporate crime is one of the best in
the volume, a true synthesis of organization and economic theory,
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together with historical analysis of industrial technology to
explain varying patterns of illegal corporate practices.
Simpson's paper is especially noteworthy in its departure from
most previous ventures into the study of white-collar crime by
criminologists. The latter typically begin by comparing street
crime to white collar crime, perhaps noting that the dark figure
of corporate illegality is much larger and more costly than any
number of petty thefts or burglaries. In appealing to other
paradigms, Simpson produces several hypotheses rooted in
organization theory and industrial development. The form of
illegality -- horizontal price-fixing and mergers, vertical
buyer-seller collusion, or mixed forms -- depends on dominance by
different subunits within the organization. Dominance by sales
and marketing subunits promotes vertical illegality and false
advertising as a firm strives to improve market share. If
corporate finance departments have greater influence, a firm's
focus shifts away from coercing customers and suppliers to
illegal mergers, and perhaps violations of health and safety
regulations. The volume of illegal behavior will be greatest in
sales and marketing subunits, since managers are more attentive
to unit performance, not routine operations. The activities of
sales and marketing units are also less subject to internal
scrutiny since they involve a large number of interactions with
persons outside the firm. As firms within a product market become
more similar, so do patterns of industry-wide criminality.
Simpson supports these propositions by linking the evolution of
corporate form and subunit dominance to changes in patterns of
illegality and federal regulations. As in all such attempts to
explain the behavior of actors in large complex organizations
over time, the framework is imperfect. But the mix of
organizational and economic incentives is a more provocative and
potentially valuable framework than attributing corporate crime
to evil executives, subcultures of deviance, or other
explanations borrowed from traditional criminology.
Of the three odd chapters, two are of little value. Robert Nash
Parker offers some preliminary thinking about how the association
between alcohol and homicide might mesh with four theoretical
perspectives on crime causation. Theory-based research on
homicide is not well developed, and Parker's failure to provide
any new insights is disappointing.
A contribution by David Weisburd, Lisa Maher, Lawrence Sherman,
and associates is interesting, but not at all suitable for this
volume. The authors examine neighborhood variation in calls for
service and attempt to interpret results in light of two ill-
defined theoretical perspectives: (1) all crime is caused by
similar factors; (2) different types of crime are caused by
different factors. Results are inconclusive.
Jeffrey Fagan's chapter on social control of spousal assault is
valuable for two reasons. First, his review serves as an excel-
lent introduction to the large and growing literature on domestic
violence, a topic that has attracted no small number of
ideologues. Although Fagan has his own agenda, he does a nice job
of synthesizing this literature. Second, there is a subtle but
incisive commentary on the initial promise but eventual failure
of arrest as a routine, rather than discretionary, response to
domestic violence.
Fagan's discussion of experimental studies and replications is
especially worthwhile in pointing out a fundamental, but too
often ignored, flaw in field experimentation. Arrest is not a
reliable intervention. Uncontrolled variation includes length of
time in custody, prior record of the arrested person, and whether
or not prosecution followed arrest. Such treatment irregularities
obviate the advantages of randomized designs. Furthermore, Fagan
points out that focusing on actions by police may naively
overlook how adaptive actions by prosecutors and judges can
neutralize arrest policies. Such insights will not be surprising
to scholars familiar with studies of trial courts, but Fagan's
commentary provides something of a new direction for
criminologists.
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Who should buy this volume? It would be misleading and of little
value for scholars who are unfamiliar with criminological theory
and seek a concise overview. Those who know something of the
field and wish to learn about new developments will be disap-
pointed by the volume's narrow scope. The value of chapters by
Simpson, Fagan, and Le Blanc and Caplan does not offset the
overwhelmingly uninteresting character of the rest of the book.
Editorial quality is poor; for example, Marc Le Blanc's name is
consistently misspelled in all but his own citations. The title
notwithstanding, new directions are difficult to find in this
volume.
Reference:
Hirschi, Travis (1969) THE CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Copyright 1993