Vol. 14 No. 2 (February 2004)
THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT,
edited by Herman Schwartz. New York: Hill and Wang, 2003. 288 pp. $25.00 Hardcover. ISBN: 0-8090-8073-7 $14.00 Paper. ISBN: 0-8090-8074-5.
Reviewed by John Fliter, Department of Political Science,
Kansas State University. Email:
jfliter@ksu.edu
This book is one of several that have been published recently
assessing the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court under the leadership of
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist.
As the subtitle implies, the essays contained within this edited
volume offer a critical review of the impact of the Rehnquist Court on civil
rights and liberties, federalism, and institutional powers. The editor, Herman Schwartz, is a professor of law at American
University and civil liberties activist. Most of the other 16 contributors to the volume are law professors,
and a couple are former journalists.
A forward by Tom Wicker puts the Rehnquist Court in perspective
by providing an historical overview of the Supreme Court and its role in
American politics. In his introduction
Professor Schwartz declares that Ronald Reagan’s efforts to reshape the
federal courts have succeeded and the Rehnquist Court is now the most conservative
Court since the 1920s. The
conservative majority consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, Anthony Kennedy, and Sandra Day O’Connor have narrowed
or reversed many of the gains for social justice and civil rights that have
been won over the past fifty years.
In some areas, however, such as women’s rights or the rights of gays
and lesbians, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor have joined with the more liberal
justices on the Court in expanding rights.
Missing from the "forward" or "introduction" is a discussion
of judicial role orientations or an explanation of the differences between
liberal judicial activism and activism on the right. As we all know, judicial
activism is not the exclusive domain of liberal justices. The conservative activism of the Rehnquist
Court is characterized by a desire to overturn long-standing precedents
of the Warren and Burger Courts, a tendency to alter firmly established
legal principles and standards, a propensity to overturn laws passed by
Congress and the states that conflict with a conservative agenda, and, in
the case of state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, a willingness
to create rights where none exist.
In an essay entitled "Equal Protection for One Lucky Guy,"
John P. McKenzie critically dismantles the Rehnquist Court’s opinion in
BUSH v. GORE (2000), the decision that stopped the Florida recount and handed
the presidency to George W. Bush.
The title of the essay is based on a one sentence disclaimer in the
opinion: "Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for
the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents
many difficulties." In this sentence the Court was saying
that the decision created no precedent and applied to only one person-candidate
George W. Bush. McKenzie argues
that not only was this statement unprecedented but also the rationale for
the opinion is contrary to the entire thrust of the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence
on federalism. Instead of showing
deference to the Florida Supreme Court decision and allowing the political
process to play itself out, the Rehnquist Court fashioned an equal protection
claim that sounded more like something from the Warren Court era.
The rest of the book is divided into three sections: Race
and Criminal Justice, Individual Rights, and The Assault on Federal Power. Each section contains four or more essays
involving various substantive rights or institutional powers. Some of the essays are more balanced in
their treatment of the Court than others, but all take a critical look at
the constitutional legacy of the Rehnquist Court. There are even chapters on topics that most political scientists
who study constitutional law rarely cover - environmental law, antitrust
law, and securities regulation.
An essay by Charles Ogletree, Jr. describes the Rehnquist
Court’s significant impact on criminal justice issues. In contrast to the due process revolution
of the Warren Court, the Rehnquist Court has launched its own counter revolution
in criminal procedure. Most,
but not all, decisions of the Court have narrowed the procedural rights
of criminal defendants. Ogletree
argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist has used judge-created procedural rules
to limit substantive rights in three areas-searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination,
and the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
In an essay entitled, "No Rights of Prisoners," author
William E. Hellerstein argues that the Rehnquist Court has had a unique
two-pronged effect on prisoners’ rights-it has seriously eroded the progressive
rulings of the Burger Court, and its jurisprudence has contained implied
messages to the legislative and executive branches that further erosion
of the rights of prisoners is acceptable.
The central thrust of almost all of the Court’s decisions in this
area has been to increase judicial deference to prison officials. In TURNER v. SAFELY (1987) and O’LONE v. ESTATE OF SHABAZZ
(1987), the Court moved from a strict scrutiny standard to a reasonableness
standard when reviewing prison regulations that restrict freedom of speech
or religion. A prisoner’s right
to due process has also been narrowed.
Prisoners, unlike others who seek due process protections, must now
plead and demonstrate that they have suffered an "atypical" and "significant"
hardship. Only a couple of
decisions involving the physical treatment of inmates have been favorable
to prisoners.
In "Capital Punishment: Accelerating the Dance with Death," Stephen Bright concludes that states’ rights and finality, rather than the Bill of Rights and fairness, have been the driving forces behind capital punishment decisions. The Court has made it more difficult for death row inmates to seek federal court review of their convictions and has made it easier for the states to execute, regardless of whether inmates were denied competent counsel, were victims of systemic race discrimination, or are actually innocent. In one of the few victories for opponents of capital punishment, the Court in ATKINS v. VIRGINIA (2002), overturned an earlier precedent and held that the execution of the mentally disabled constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Norman Redlich, in an essay aptly named, "The Religion Clauses: A Study in Confusion," argues that the Rehnquist Court inherited several flexible constitutional doctrines covering free exercise and establishment clause claims but has left us with a multitude of conflicting and contradictory principles. Church-state separation has been severely weakened by countervailing doctrines of accommodation, an elusive neutrality toward religion, and the use of free speech principles to protect religious activities in public forums. For example, in ROSENBERGER v. RECTOR AND VISITORS OF UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA (1995), the Court applied public forum analysis to strike down a university regulation that denied funding to a student group for a sectarian religious publication. The decision elevated free speech rights over establishment clause concerns. As a result, the wall of separation between church and state today is more like a picket fence. Strict separationists can take some comfort, however, in the fact that the Rehnquist Court has not permitted direct aid to religious schools and it has consistently opposed state-sponsored prayer in schools. In its most significant free exercise decision, EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v. SMITH (1990), the Court rejected the compelling state interest standard in favor of what is now called the SMITH rule: if a generally applicable statute that is neutral toward religion has the incidental effect of restricting religious practices, it does not violate the free exercise clause. The test protects state and local governments at the expense of individual free exercise rights. Congress tried to reverse this decision with passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (1993) but the Court struck down the law in CITY OF BOERNE v. FLORES (1997).
According to Jamin B. Raskin, freedom of speech appears
to be the one area where the Rehnquist Court deserves a standing ovation
for its protection of extreme or unpopular expression. Raunchy political and social satire was protected in HUSTLER
MAGAZINE v. FALWELL (1988), and flag burning was held to be protected symbolic
political speech in TEXAS v. JOHNSON (1989). Even conservatives like Justice Scalia have occasionally joined
the Court in defending free speech. Raskin suggests that the conservative backlash to "political
correctness" gave free speech a special status in conservative circles,
and he contends that Scalia’s opinion in R.A.V. v. CITY OF ST. PAUL (1992),
which invalidated a hate-speech ordinance, was partly influenced by conservative
anti-PC sentiment. The Court
also has handed down several libertarian decisions involving the Internet,
often treating cyberspace as a free marketplace of ideas. But where extreme speech has won protection, Raskin argues
that ordinary speech, in the context of government practices, has suffered
significant defeats. For example,
the Court embraced our dominant two-party system by permitting a public
television station to exclude a third party candidate from a debate. The Court also upheld anti-abortion regulations,
known as the abortion gag rules, which prohibited any program receiving
Title X funds from counseling or advocating abortion as a method of family
planning.
In a chapter on gay rights, Chai Feldblum provides a fair
assessment of the Rehnquist Court’s mixed record on the rights of gays and
lesbians. The decision in BOWERS
v. HARDWICK (1986), which upheld Georgia’s sodomy law, was announced shortly
before Rehnquist became Chief Justice.
It would take almost ten years before the Court heard another case
involving gay rights. In HURLEY
v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN, AND BI-SEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON (1995), the
Court concluded that parade organizers had a free speech right to exclude
an Irish gay group from the parade’s participants.
A year later, in ROMER v. EVANS, the Court struck down a state constitutional
amendment in Colorado that prohibited gays and lesbians from seeking protection
from discrimination under state and local laws. That victory, however, was followed by
the decision in BOY SCOUTS v. DALE (2000). The Court said that Dale, an Eagle Scout and avowed homosexual,
could be excluded from the Boy Scouts on free speech and association grounds
because homosexuality was incompatible with the mission of the organization.
Unfortunately, the book went to press before Feldblum could include
the Court’s decision in LAWRENCE v. TEXAS (2003), which overturned the Bowers
precedent and has emboldened the gay and lesbian rights movement.
A woman’s right to abortion under ROE v. WADE (1973) has
barely survived. Susan Estrich’s
essay is effective because it focuses more on the politics of abortion rather
than the many opinions handed down by the Rehnquist Court. The Court’s most significant decision,
PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CASEY (1992), discarded the ROE trimester framework
and replaced it with a vague "undue burden" standard.
State governments may place restrictions on abortion unless those
restrictions impose an undue burden on a woman’s access to the procedure.
Herman Schwartz has a chapter entitled, "The States’ Rights
Assault on Federal Authority." The
Rehnquist Court has been very active in promoting a states’ rights agenda
within our federal system. With
the appointment of Justice Clarence Thomas in 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and the other conservatives now had the five votes needed to launch their
assault on federal power, and the decision in NEW YORK v. UNITED STATES
(1992) represented the first salvo.
The Court struck down an interstate compact, enforced by federal
law, that attempted to find dumping locations for radioactive waste.
By a 5-4 vote in U.S. v. LOPEZ (1995), the Court struck down a federal
law criminalizing the possession of a gun within a thousand feet of a school
because they saw no connection between guns in schools and interstate commerce. Several other decisions limiting congressional
power followed with the same 5-4 majority.
Another topic covered in the section on federal power is
the rights of the disabled. Andrew
Imparato argues that the Rehnquist Court has advanced a "miserly" interpretation
of disability rights. The Court
has consistently taken a narrow interpretation of the definition of a mental
or physical disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990).
Using a broad interpretation of state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court also has issued several opinions limiting
the ability of disabled public employees to sue state governments in either
federal or state courts for damages, thus narrowing the scope of their civil
rights.
Rounding out this section is an essay by Eleanor Fox on
antitrust litigation and corporate power, and the book ends with an essay
by Lawrence E. Mitchell on how the Rehnquist Court has handled securities
regulation. These essays are
fine although ending the book with a chapter on securities law was a bit
unsatisfying. I was hoping
to find a concluding chapter with a "what is to be done" theme or "there
is light at the end of the tunnel" message.
Perhaps it would be too difficult to write a chapter like that given
the current balance of power within government.
Because of the breadth of the topics covered, this volume
will make a good supplement to a course on constitutional law or a more
specialized course on the Supreme Court or judicial policymaking. The book succeeds at what it attempts
to do - provide a doctrinal summary and critique of the Rehnquist Court’s
jurisprudence. Political scientists
will not find much discussion of strategic interaction among the justices
or institutional influences on decision making. Still, the book has much to offer. For citizens, students, and scholars concerned
about the Rehnquist Court’s attack on federal power, the social programs
of the New Deal, and the general assault on civil rights and liberties,
this book is essential reading.
CASE REFERENCES:
ATKINS v. VIRGINIA, 122 S.Ct 2242 (2002).
BOWERS v. HARDWICK, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
BOY SCOUTS v. DALE, 530 US 640 (2000).
BUSH v. GORE, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
CITY OF BOERNE v. FLORES, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION OF OREGON v. SMITH, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN, AND BI-SEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
HUSTLER MAGAZINE v. FALWELL, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
LAWRENCE v. TEXAS, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)
NEW YORK v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
O’LONE v. ESTATE OF SHABAZZ, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CASEY, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
R.A.V. v. CITY OF ST. PAUL, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
ROE v. WADE, 410 US 113 (1973)
ROMER v. EVANS, 517 US 620 (1996).
ROSENBERGER v. RECTOR AND VISITORS OF UNV. OF VIRGINIA, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
TEXAS v. JOHNSON, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
TURNER v. SAFELY, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
U.S. v. LOPEZ, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Copyright 2004 by the author, John Fliter.